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THE DEATH OF APPRAISAL ARBITRAGE: 
ENDING WINDFALLS FOR DEAL DISSENTERS 
 
WILLIAM J. CARNEY & KEITH SHARFMAN* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In this article, we take note of a new and positive development in 
Delaware's law of appraisal: more robust enforcement of Section 262(h), 
which expressly excludes from fair value in appraisal litigation the value 
that is uniquely associated with the deal from which the shareholders 
seeking appraisal are dissenting.  For public firms, this implies that deal 
dissenters are entitled to no more than the price that prevailed prior to the 
deal's announcement.  
 
In a salutary development, the Delaware Chancery Court took this 
approach in its recent appraisal decision in Verition Master Fund 
Partners, Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., awarding to the deal dissenters the 
pre-announcement price and striking a blow against "appraisal 
arbitrage"—a trading and litigation strategy that is predicated on deal 
dissenters receiving appraisal remedies in excess of the deal prices from 
which they dissent.  
 
We explore here the historical and economic rationales for limiting 
the appraisal remedy in this fashion.  And we conclude with some 
recommendations for ending or limiting appraisal windfalls in the context 
of private firms as well via contractual and corporate bylaw valuation 
mechanisms that would replace judicial with market valuation in 
appraisal litigation as well as select litigation fora that would be amenable 
to enforcement of such mechanisms. 
                                                                                                                       
* Charles Howard Candler Professor Emeritus, Emory University Law School, and 
Professor of Law & Director of Bankruptcy Studies, St. John’s University Law School, 
respectively.  The authors have previously filed an amicus brief on this subject with the Delaware 
Supreme Court.  Brief of Law and Corporate Finance Professors, DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield 
Value Partners L.P., 2017 WL 182742. Many thanks to participants at a workshop at the 
University of Chicago helpful comments and to Dean Michael Simons of the St. John’s 
University School of Law for financial support.” 
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INTRODUCTION 
  
“Appraisal proceedings have hardly been the Delaware courts' finest 
moments.”1 
 
The Delaware courts have recently been swamped with a wave of 
appraisal actions, even as other forms of merger and acquisition litigation 
have abated, due to the increasingly clear bright lines and safe harbors for 
fiduciary behavior that these courts have evolved in recent years.2  The 
earlier litigation was inspired by opaque standards of behavior that left the 
courtroom door open for plaintiffs to file complaints and remain in court 
long enough to drag settlements out of many corporate defendants.  This 
uncertainty was criticized and discussed by many scholars and lawyers.3 
 
Now the opaque nature of legal standards has turned to appraisal 
cases.  Dissenting shareholders are entitled to dissent and be awarded the 
“fair value” of their shares, without consideration of any value resulting 
from anticipation or realization of the merger.4  In many areas of law, there 
is a simple standard applied—what a reasonable and informed seller and 
buyer would agree upon— each being fully informed and under no 
constraints.  But that contemplates a “deal,” which is exactly what the 
appraisal remedy allows shareholders to avoid.  In real life markets, 
involving sufficient information and trading activity, investors must 
accept the market price as the only one available, whether buying or 
selling.  That price is the result of hundreds if not thousands of “deals” by 
reasonable investors.5  But in Delaware, valuation of a dissenter’s shares 
                                                                                                                       
1 William J. Carney & Mark Heimendinger, Appraising the Nonexistent: The Delaware 
Courts’ Struggle with Control Premiums, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 845 (2003). 
2 As other forms of merger litigation decline, appraisal filings in Delaware have 
increased from 20 cases in 2012 to 48 in 2016, a 240% increase in four years.  Appraisal Risk in 
Private Equity Transactions, PRIV. EQUITY DIG. (Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison 
LLP), May 2017, https://www.paulweiss.com/media/3977122/may-2017-pe-digest-r15.pdf.  A 
recent study showed that appraisal petitions increased from about 2% of deals in the early 2000s 
to around 25% in the 2010s.  The top seven hedge funds seeking appraisal accounted for over 
50% of the dollar value in all appraisals.  Wei Jiang, et al., Appraisal: Shareholder Remedy or 
Litigation Arbitrage?, 59 J. L. & ECON. 697, 698 (2016).  Another study shows that multiple 
petitions are being filed in these cases, with 77 petitions in 2016.  Michael Greene, Dealmakers 
Eye Safeguards Amid Rising Valuation Challenges, BLOOMBERG BNA, (Apr. 18, 2017), 
https://www.bna.com/dealmakers-eye-safeguards-n57982086799/. 
3 We only cite one of these criticisms here: See e.g.,  William J. Carney & George B. 
Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (2009). 
4 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (Supp. 2016). 
5 “In such circumstances, a company's stock price ‘reflects the judgments of many 
stockholders about the company's future prospects, based on public filings, industry information, 
and research conducted by equity analysts.’ In these circumstances, a mass of investors quickly 
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ignores the realities of the market6 and, in the words of Chief Justice 
Strine, fair value has become “a jurisprudential, rather than purely 
economic, construct.”7  Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel had a more 
jaded view of fairness: “an empty vessel into which lawyers and judges 
can pour whatever content suits them and their clients from time to time.”8 
 
For most investors, determining value is as simple as looking at the 
current price of a stock, and applying whatever analytical skills they may 
have, deciding whether the price is “fair” (a word they would not generally 
use) and acting upon it.  Sophisticated investors understand how much 
knowledge and analysis have gone into determining that price, and 
understand that relative to other price estimates, it is “fair” in the sense of 
an unbiased assessment of value by market participants.  The Delaware 
courts’ departure from (or discounting of) this commonly accepted 
evidence has led to extensive litigation and interminably long opinions in 
many cases.  In this Article, we explore how this has happened, and what 
should be done about it.  We also observe a major step in the right direction 
by the Court of Chancery in Verition Partners Master Fund LTD v. Aruba 
Networks, Inc (“Aruba”).9 
 
Part I discusses the history and purpose of the appraisal remedy and 
shows that it was merely intended to provide an exit to avoid the 
                                                                                                                       
digests all publicly available information about a company, and in trading the company's stock, 
recalibrates its price to reflect the market's adjusted, consensus valuation of the company.”  Dell, 
Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund, Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 45–46 (Del. 2017). 
6 See  In re Appraisal of Dell, Inc., No. 9322-VCL, 2016 WL 3186538, at *23 (Del. Ch. 
May 31, 2016) (“Requiring the Court of Chancery to defer – conclusively or presumptively – to 
the merger price, even in the face of a pristine, unchallenged transactional process, would 
contravene the unambiguous language of the statute and the reasoned holdings of our 
precedent”) (citing Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Glob. GT LP, 11 A.2d 214, 217-18 (Del. 2010)).  
On the other hand, for reasons we expand on below, accepting the deal price over the pre-
announcement market price also contravenes the unambiguous language of the same statute, 
which excludes consideration of anticipated or realized effects of the transaction.  
7 DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, 172 A.3d 346, 367 (Del. 2017). 
8 “Fairness is an invulnerable position; who is for unfairness?  But for lawyers fairness 
is ‘a suitcase full of bottled ethics from which one freely chooses to blend his own type of 
justice.'" William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing 
Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 25 (2009) (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, 
Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 703 n.17 (1982)) (quoting George Stigler, 
The Law and Economics of Public Policy: A Plea to the Scholars, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1972))..  
See also  Veritian Partners Master Fund Ltd. V. Aruba Networks, Inc., No. 11448-VCL, 2018 
WL 2315943 (Del. Ch, May 21, 2018) (“Aruba II”). 
9 Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., No. 11448–VCL, 2018 
WL 922139 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018) (“Aruba”). 
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(presumably negative) consequences of a merger for a nonconsenting 
shareholder. 
 
Part II discusses the history of valuation in the Delaware courts, 
which involved deep suspicion of the fairness and rationality of even 
highly developed and well-informed markets.  This evolved, as recently 
characterized by the Supreme Court, into a question, not of economic fact, 
but of “jurisprudence.” 
 
Part III briefly reviews modern knowledge about the value of 
publicly traded stocks, much of which has been recited by the Supreme 
Court in its opinion in DFC Global Corporation v. Muirfield Value 
Partners, L.P, and in Dell.10  Much of this knowledge is explored in a 
theoretical fashion in appraisal litigation, with opposing experts usually 
making different assumptions to produce sometimes wildly varying 
results, with little or no relationship to pre-deal market prices.  All this, we 
assert, is much ado about nothing, when there is an established and 
efficient market that has valued the stock immediately before a deal 
announcement. 
 
Part IV notes that while the Delaware courts have moved closer to 
respect for deal values, they have repeatedly declined to give up their 
broad “jurisprudential” discretion in determining value.  Ironically, while 
relying on a statutory command to consider “all relevant factors” as 
authority for this discretion, the courts have largely ignored the limitation 
in the preceding sentence of the statute to exclude “elements of value 
arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger . . . .” 11  The 
courts have too often begun with the deal price, if determined in good faith 
after a search for the highest price.  In many cases the analysis stops 
there—ignoring the value attributable to the merger—the gains from trade.  
In others the experts on each side attempt to guess what portion of the deal 
price is attributable to the synergies reflected in the deal price.  All of this 
is done in the face of a plain answer—the difference between the pre-
announcement market price and the deal price. 
 
Part V explores possible solutions to the inefficiency of appraisal 
litigation, which consumes judicial resources and the public purse, adds 
uncertainty to buyers’ cost calculations, and in some cases chills deals or 
reduces the prices that buyers are willing to agree to, given the risk of 
litigation costs and awards that appraisal litigation would entail.  While 
                                                                                                                       
10 DFC Global, 172 A.3d 346; Dell, Inc., 177 A.3d 1, 45.  
 11 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h). 
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our analysis mainly addresses appraisal in cases where an efficient capital 
market exists, much of what we criticize in those cases is sometimes 
necessary, though perilous, where there is no market price. 
 
Our core proposal is for courts called upon to value shares of public 
firms in appraisal litigation to rely exclusively and conclusively on the 
unconflicted, arms’ length pre-deal market price (if one exists) in 
determining fair value.  Secondarily, we consider other market-based and 
market mimicking reforms for appraisal litigation in the case of closely 
held firms, where no pre-deal market price is available for the court to 
consider.   
 
I. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE APPRAISAL REMEDY 
 
The concept of appraisal of the shares of dissenters in mergers arose 
in an era when corporate charters were regarded as contracts between and 
among the state and shareholders.12  As a result, important mergers in 
railroads and other developing industries generally required the consent of 
all shareholders to proceed.13  It became apparent that allowing a single 
dissenter to block otherwise valuable transactions was neither good 
judicial nor legislative policy.  The courts moved first: in Lauman v. 
Lebanon Valley R.R., the court analogized a merger to the sale of assets 
and dissolution of a company, which did not require unanimity, and 
allowed the proposed merger to proceed, provided the dissenter was 
provided the same value he or she would receive in an asset sale, and 
issued an injunction until the corporation gave security for the payment 
“when its value shall be ascertained.”14  Lauman expressly stated the 
contractual rationale for an exit: that the shareholder had contracted to be 
in one corporation for a specific purpose, and could not be forced into 
another without his consent.15  The court analogized this shareholder 
                                                                                                                       
12 See  Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
13 William Carney, Fundamental Corporate Changes, Minority Shareholders, and 
Business Purposes, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 69, 77–82.  
14 Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R. Co., 30 Pa. 42, 49 (1858); Accord  State ex rel. Brown 
v. Bailey, 16 Ind. 46, 51–52 (1861) (citing Lauman, 30 Pa. at 47).  
15 Lauman, 30 Pa. at 45–46 (“If the principle of the association is violated by a majority 
of its members, by a departure from its original purposes, or by a refusal, or voluntarily produced 
inability to proceed, any stockholder may treat such a matter as equivalent to a dissolution, at 
least as regards him, and for such a case the law provides a means of securing to him his share 
of the property, or its value. . . . Then, what valid objection can a dissenting stockholder of a 
private corporation have to such an arrangement as the one now proposed? . . . He may object 
that his co-corporators have no power to make a new contract for him, and thereby constitute 
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action to a suit in partition of jointly owned real property.  Where a statute 
authorized a majority to approve a merger, objecting shareholders were 
presumed to have consented to the merger, as they purchased their shares 
under this rule.16  Throughout the 19th century and into the early 20th 
century, this approach became accepted: where the majority was granted 
the power of approval, some states granted appraisal rights to dissenters.17  
Manning observed that appraisal statutes became the norm over time.18 
 
Why grant dissenting shareholders an exit remedy when the 
majority has approved a transaction, presumably on the basis of net 
benefits that they reasonably expect?  One explanation might be the fear 
of majority self-dealing in mergers or other combinations, a well-known 
issue even by the early 20th century.19  Requiring appraisal values to 
exclude the potentially adverse effects of a merger on the value of a 
company’s stock provides protection for minorities from being exploited.  
Recent Delaware opinions seem to have recognized this principle.20  One 
might have thought that it would provide a disincentive for quarreling over 
whether the upside gains from a majority-approved merger were large 
enough, but it has generally failed to do so.   
 
 
                                                                                                                       
him a member of a new and different corporation; for it is of the very nature of a contract relation 
that it can be instituted only by the real parties to it . . . .”).   
16 VICTOR MORAWETZ, 2 A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 951, at 909 
(2d ed. 1886). 
17 See  Seymour D. Thompson & Joseph W. Thompson, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW 
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 6060, at 884–85 (2d ed. 1910). 
18 Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 
72 YALE L. J. 223, 226 (1962–1963). 
19 See  Carney, supra note 13, at 71–72. Until 2016 the Model Business Corporation Act 
followed this approach for public companies, denying appraisal rights in publicly traded 
corporations where exit was simple, but restoring them where the merger was an “interested 
transaction.”  MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §13.02(b)(4) (2016).  Indeed, Lauman was such a case 
where the surviving corporation owned a majority of the shares of the acquired corporation.  
Lauman, 30 Pa. at 43. 
20 In Dell, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that “the key inquiry is whether the 
dissenters got fair value and were not exploited.” 177 A.3d at 24.  As Vice Chancellor Laster 
stated in Aruba, referring to this statement in Dell, “the reference to ‘dissenters’ in this sentence 
strikes me as odd because the dissenters have opted not to receive the merger consideration.  By 
seeking appraisal, they avoided the possibility of being ‘exploited’ by the deal.”  Verition 
Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., No. 11448–VCL, 2018 WL 922139 at *36 
n.338 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018).  He also stated that “[w]ith a reliable market price as the base 
line, an arms-length deal at a premium is non-exploitive.  By definition, it provides stockholders 
with ‘fair compensation for their shares’ defined as ‘what they deserve to receive based on what 
would be fairly given to them in an arm’s-length transaction.’”  Id. at *40 (quoting DFC, 172 
A.3d at 371).  
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A. The Purpose of the Remedy 
 
1. Exit 
 
Bayless Manning described appraisal remedies as a way of giving 
the majority permission to act, rather than protection for the minority.21  
He described this as the “willingness to play for the rebound in history.”22  
It also had the effect of allowing dissenters to exit from newly combined 
enterprises in which they did not intend to invest, providing some liquidity 
in an era when markets were limited in depth and liquidity.23  Manning 
described appraisal statutes as “bail-out provisions; when certain events 
occur, some shareholders are given a  put against the corporation.”24  The 
Delaware Chancellor agreed with this analysis in Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 
stating that:  
 
[S]tatutes were enacted in state after state which 
took from him [the stockholder] the right 
theretofore existing to defeat the welding of his 
corporation with another.  In compensation for 
the lost right a provision was written into the 
modern statutes giving the dissenting stockholder 
the option completely to retire from the enterprise 
and receive the value of his stock in money.25 
 
In many of today’s cash mergers, the structure of the merger itself 
assures that right.  
 
2. Value Protection 
 
As Manning famously put it, “permissions and protections have a 
way of getting scrambled in corporation law.”26  An appraisal right that 
                                                                                                                       
21 See  Manning, supra note 18, at 226–27; see also Norman D. Lattin, Remedies of 
Dissenting Stockholders Under Appraisal Statutes, 43 HARV. L. REV. 233, 237 (1931–1932) 
(the purpose has been “[t]o placate the dissenting minority and, at the same time, to facilitate the 
carrying out of changes of a desirable and extreme sort. . . .”); JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE 
HAZEN, 4 TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 22:24 (3d ed. 2010) (“[I]t appears the 
purpose is even more to aid and protect the majority.”). 
22 Manning, supra note 18, at 229. 
23 Barry M. Wertheimer, The Purpose of the Shareholder’ Appraisal Remedy, 65 TENN. 
L. REV. 661, 667 (1997–1998). 
24 Manning, supra note 18, at 226. 
25 Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 172 A. 452, 455 (Del. Ch. 1934). 
26 Manning, supra note 18, at 228. 
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began as permission for majorities to proceed without unanimous consent 
ended as a right for minorities to attack deal prices and seek favored 
financial treatment.  As a result, instead of being permission for the 
majority it has morphed into a potent weapon for the minority, and, in 
many cases, a late arriving minority—appraisal arbitrageurs—who buy 
after the deal announcement and seek a higher price than other 
shareholders would receive. 
 
Early statutes authorizing the appraisal remedy did not specify how 
value was to be determined, but relied in many cases on outside experts to 
serve as appraisers, as did Delaware.27  New Jersey, upon whose statute 
Delaware’s was originally based, called for three appraisers to determine 
“full market value” of the dissenter’s shares.28  For a long time this meant 
“fair market value” in Delaware as well as elsewhere.29  As Manning 
observed, “[n]one of the statutes attempts to go much further in assigning 
content to the word ‘value,’ though a few seek to reassure the shareholder 
by providing that he is entitled to the ‘fair value.’”30  One can assume that 
                                                                                                                       
27 J. ERNEST SMITH, THE LAW OF PRIVATE COMPANIES: RELATING TO BUSINESS 
CORPORATIONS ORGANIZED UNDER THE GENERAL CORPORATION LAWS OF THE STATE OF 
DELAWARE, § 56 at 69 (Philadelphia, T. & J. Johnson & Co. 1899); In other cases it was left to 
the court. Thompson & Thompson, supra note 17, at 884. See 21 Del. Laws 462–63 (1899). 
28 Section 108 of the New Jersey General Corporation Act of 1896, P.L. 1896, p. 312, 
P.L. 1902, p. 700, as amended by P.L. 1920, p. 284.  Delaware followed this approach in the 
General Code of 1899, §56 and in §61 of the General Corporation Law, Del. Rev. Code 1935, 
§2093, the latter of which read in part: If any stockholder in any corporation of this State 
consolidating or merging as aforesaid, who objected thereto in writing, shall within twenty days 
after the date on which the agreement of consolidation or merger has been filed and recorded, 
as aforesaid, demand in writing from the corporation resulting from or surviving such 
consolidation or merger, payment of his stock, such resulting or surviving corporation shall, 
within three months thereafter, pay to him the value of his stock at said date, exclusive of any 
element of value arising from the expectation or accomplishment of such consolidation or 
merger. 
29 Rather than look to markets, fair market value was defined by the courts to mean the 
“price which would be agreed upon by a willing seller and a willing buyer under usual and 
ordinary circumstances, without any compulsion whatsoever on the seller to sell or the buyer to 
buy”. Poole v. N. V. Deli Maatschappij, 243 A.2d 67, 70, n. 1 (Del. 1965) (citing Wilmington 
Housing Authority v. Harris, 93 A.2d 518, 521 (1952)). Because of the abstractions that blurred 
the importance of evidence of actual transactions, and reliance on various hypothetical models 
of value, the powerful evidence of actual market prices was ignored. It was only in 1976 that 
“fair value” was added, 60 Del. L. c. 371, §7, and in 1981 the instruction to take “all relevant 
factors” into account, 63 Del. L. c. 25, §14 was added. We assume that this was merely a 
reflection of the judicial gloss already placed on the statute.  See, e.g., Tri-Continental Corp. v. 
Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950) (finding that the definition of “value” under the appraisal 
statute included “all factors and elements which reasonably might enter into the fixing of 
value”); Francis I. duPont & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 312 A.2d 344, 348 (Del. Ch. 
1973), (hereinafter “duPont”). 
30 Manning, supra note 18, at 231. 
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in the early stages of these cases, the appraiser’s judgments were based on 
crude tools of valuation, especially in the absence of the more 
sophisticated markets of modern times, although where active markets 
existed, appraisers may have relied upon them.  As we show, primitive 
techniques, implicitly conceding considerable uncertainty about the 
validity of separate methodologies, continued through much of the 
twentieth century.  If the purpose of appraisal is to allow shareholders to 
escape the consequences of a deal they didn’t bargain for, it becomes clear 
that the “value” involved is the value of shares of the firm from which they 
exit (now clarified to exclude the anticipated effects of an announced 
merger).  Modern liquid securities markets now have much more to say 
about this subject. 
 
The Delaware Supreme Court recently reiterated this principle, 
quoting an earlier opinion to the effect that the purpose of appraisal is to 
“make sure that [stockholders] receive fair compensation for their shares 
in the sense that it reflects what they deserve to receive based on what 
would fairly be given to them in an arm’s-length transaction.”31  All 
transactions in efficient markets qualify for that measure; bilateral 
negotiations between a single buyer and seller provide indeterminate 
results, depending on the skills, preferences, and relative knowledge of 
each party.32 
 
3. Conflicting Interest Protections and Universal Shareholder 
Protection 
 
Note that compensating dissenting shareholders for what they give 
up protects them, among other things, from the deleterious effects of any 
conflicts of interest that might affect the merger terms in favor of a 
controlling shareholder.  Prior to the merger, shareholders are protected 
from conflicts by the fiduciary duties of the officers and board, which are 
enforceable in a derivative action.  The courts have erred in looking at the 
conflicts involved in setting a deal price, because the deal price is not the 
issue, and indeed is expressly excluded from consideration by Section 
262(h) of the General Corporation Law of the State of Delaware (“Section 
                                                                                                                       
31 Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 19 n.79 
(Del. 2017), citing DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 370–71 
(Del. 2017) 
32 For a discussion showing that equilibrium may be reached at any point along a 
contract curve, see Armen A. Alchian & William R. Allen, UNIVERSITY ECONOMICS: 
ELEMENTS OF INQUIRY 47–49 (3d ed. 1972). 
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262(h)”), which enjoins consideration of “any element of value arising 
from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or consolidation.”33  
As Judge Wolcott observed in Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye: 
 
The meaning of the word “value” under this section of the 
Corporation Law has never been considered by this court.  
*   *   *  The basic concept of value under the appraisal 
statute is that the stockholder is entitled to be paid for that 
which has been taken from him, viz., his proportionate 
interest in a going concern.34 
 
Other authorities read this as clearly excluding any value created by 
or expected from the merger.  As Ernest Folk, the author of the report 
prepared for the 1967 revision of the Delaware Corporation Act, stated, 
“[i]n all instances, shares are to be valued on a going-concern, rather than 
on a liquidation basis, ‘by which of course is meant as if the merger had 
never been conceived.’” (emphasis added).35 
 
Consider the benefits of this exclusion: (1) it allows dissenters to 
exit from any deal they wish, and (2) it protects against an abusive 
conflicted interest deal with a controlling shareholder.  It has one more 
benefit that is perhaps more cogent today: it prevents speculation over 
what price a court might set above the deal price, or even at the deal price.  
In short, a dissenter would bear the risk (or strong probability) of getting 
less than the deal price, but would always get the previous market price, 
which would be fair even to appraisal arbitrageurs, provided they paid no 
more than the pre-announcement market price (an unrealistic assumption, 
but one that precludes post-deal speculation). 
 
                                                                                                                       
33 In re Appraisal of Orchard Enters., No. 5713-CS, 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 165, at *15–
16 (Del. Ch. July, 16, 2012). The error of looking at deal price rather than preceding market 
value where a company’s stock is widely followed and continued in In re Appraisal of  Dell, 
Inc., where Vice Chancellor Laster  stated that LBO models of valuation are unreliable because 
“[w]hat the sponsor is willing to pay diverges from fair market value because of (i) the financial 
sponsor’s need to achieve IRRs of 20% or more to satisfy its own investors and (ii) limits on the 
amount of leverage that the company can support and the sponsor can use to finance the deal.” 
Any investor that owned Dell stock was aware that Michael Dell was the controlling shareholder, 
so the price paid for shares was fair, and the market price before the deal was equally fair - unless 
one ignores the exclusion of Section 262(h). 
34 Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950). 
35 Ernest L. Folk, III, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW: A COMMENTARY 
AND ANALYSIS 380 (1972) (citing Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 172 A. 452, 455 (Del. Ch. 1934)) 
(citation omitted).  Later decisions have ignored the statutory language, either paying lip service 
to it or ignoring it entirely.  See infra Appendix A. 
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Because of abstractions away from true market prices, courts have 
generally ignored the command to exclude these elements of value.  Where 
this provision of Section 262(h) was cited, it was only as a matter of 
quotation of the entire section, rather than as providing any guidance.36  In 
short, it was only given lip service, not respect.  It was not until 1990 that 
Chancellor Allen recognized and applied the significance of this provision, 
and even then, it remained an exception.37 
 
II. THE HISTORY OF JUDICIAL VALUATION IN APPRAISAL DECISIONS 
 
Here we recount some history of appraisal in Delaware to illustrate 
the difficulties facing courts in determining “fair value.”  In fairness, the 
Delaware courts have not been alone. 
 
A. Rejecting Market Value 
 
The journey of the Delaware courts away from appraisal on the basis 
of market value where a stock was traded actively, began in 1934 with 
Chicago Corp. v. Munds.38  There, the Chancellor distinguished the 
                                                                                                                       
36 See, e.g., id.; Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137, 141 (Del. 1980); Glob. GT 
LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc., 993 A.2d 497, 507 (Del. Ch.), aff’d, 11 A.3d 214 (Del. 2010); DFC, 
172 A.3d at 364, 368; M.P.M. Enters., Inc. v. Gilbert, 731 A.2d 790, 793 n.6, 795–97 (Del. 
1999). 
37 Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, No. 7129, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 259, at *106 (Del. Ch. 
Oct. 19, 1990). See also Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., No. 11448–
VCL, 2018 WL 922139, at *54 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018).  It was only within the past decade that 
courts sometimes used the statute’s caution, but this was based on theoretical models of value 
and theoretical models of the value of synergies, rather than on pre-announcement market prices 
to determine value.  See, e.g., Highfields Capital, Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 36 (Del. 
Ch. 2007).  In Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., No. 8474, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
144, 13–14, n.9 (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 1996), reprinted in DEL. J. CORP. L. 1215, the court 
obliquely addressed the complications introduced through theoretical measures of value, such 
as sales of comparable companies: “[T]his technique masks a complex issue: whether in an 
appraisal action ‘fair value’ of the corporation as a going concern, exclusive of [speculative] 
elements of value arising from a merger, includes a pro rata share of a control premium. (By 
determining a multiple by reference to sales of companies, Mr. Kobak implicitly includes a 
control premium).  That question is especially interesting when, as here, the corporation itself 
has had a controlling block of stock.”  Application of Vision Hardware Grp., 669 A.2d 671, 673 
(Del. Ch. 1995) held that “the common stock of Better Vision had essentially no financial value 
at the time of the merger; the amount paid in the merger represented ‘nuisance value’ and 
exceeded the fair value of the public shares prior to the merger.” 
38 Chicago Corp., 172 A. at 457.  1929 amendments to the Delaware statute took this 
approach. DEL. CODE REV. § 2093 (1935) (enacted 1929).  Mary Siegel, Back to the Future: 
Appraisal Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 79, 89–90 n. 46 (1995).   
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Delaware statute from  New Jersey’s version, which, while based on the 
New Jersey act, omitted the words “full market,” and referred only to 
“value.”39  In justifying his rejection of reliance on “market value,” the 
Chancellor stated: 
 
When it is said that the appraisal which the market puts 
upon the value of the stock of an active corporation as 
evidenced by its daily quotations, is an accurate, fair 
reflection of its intrinsic value, no more than a moment’s 
reflection is needed to refute it.  There are too many 
accidental circumstances entering into the making of 
market prices to admit them as sure and exclusive 
reflectors of fair value.  The experience of recent years is 
enough to convince the most casual observer that the 
market in its appraisal of values must have been woefully 
wrong in its estimates at one time or another within the 
interval of a space in time so brief that fundamental 
conditions could not possibly have become so altered as 
to effect true worth.  Markets are known to gyrate in a 
single day.  The numerous causes that contribute to their 
nervous leaps from dejected melancholy to exhilarated 
enthusiasm and then back again from joy to grief, need 
not be reviewed.  It would be most unfortunate indeed 
either for the consolidated corporation or for the objecting 
stockholder if, on the particular date named by the statute 
for the valuation of the dissenter’s stock, viz., the date of 
the consolidation, the market should be in one of its 
extreme moods and the stock had to be paid for at the price 
fixed by the quotations of that day.  Even when conditions 
are normal and no economic forces are at work unduly to 
exalt or depress the financial hopes of man, market 
quotations are not safe to accept as unerring expressions 
of value.  The relation of supply to demand on a given day 
as truly affects the market value of a stock as it does of a 
commodity; and temporary supply and demand are in turn 
affected by numerous circumstances which are wholly 
                                                                                                                       
39 Fair market value meant the "price which would be agreed upon by a willing seller 
and a willing buyer under usual and ordinary circumstances, without any compulsion whatsoever 
on the seller to sell or the buyer to buy". State ex rel. Smith v. 0.15 Acres of Land, 169 A.2d 
256, 258 (Del. 1961). 
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disconnected from considerations having to do with the 
stock’s inherent worth.40 
 
The Munds Court wrote of its distrust of market prices in the wake 
of the great stock market crash of 1929.  While observers at the time 
appeared to have no rational explanation beyond excessive speculation and 
stock manipulation that caused a bubble to burst, later scholarship by 
Milton Friedman demonstrated that the crash was caused by the Federal 
Reserve’s drastic reduction of the money supply.41  A similar explanation 
may account for the 2008 drop.  After the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in 
the Fall of 2008 regulators quickly increased bank capital requirements 
from 4% of total assets to 7%.42  Given depressed stock prices, banks chose 
not to issue new shares but to reduce loans outstanding, which ultimately 
denied credit to businesses that depended on a reliable stream of credit.43 
 
The October 1987 drop, however, which was reversed within two 
years,44 had no such obvious explanation.45  One theory is that virtually all 
                                                                                                                       
40 Chicago Corp., 172 A. at 455.  We now know now that stock prices are a random 
walk, depending upon the flow of new information about the companies. Eugene F. Fama, 
Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Sept.–Oct. 1965, at 55, 56.  Relative 
prices will change only upon the revelation of new information, which flows constantly and 
keeps stock prices in a state of flux. Thus, a statement that a price is "fair" is true at the moment 
of purchase but is no guarantee that a security will hold its value relative to the market as news 
about the issuer develops. 
41 MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES 1867–1960 (1963) (discussing the contraction of economic activity between 
1929—1933). 
 42 See  Jack Foster, Changes in US Banking Regulation – Tier 1 Capital Requirements, 
N.Y. INST. FIN., https://www.nyif.com/articles/changes-in-us-banking-regulation-tier-1-capital-
requirements (last visited Oct. 20, 2018). 
43 Tim Congdon and Steve H. Hanke, More Bank Capital Could Kill the Economy, 
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/more-bank-capital-could-kill-the-
economy-1489446254. 
44 Adam Hewison, It Takes a Long Time for a Market Recovery, INO (Oct. 13, 2008), 
https://www.ino.com/blog/2008/10/it-takes-a-long-time-for-a-market-recovery/#.W8jpGntKjcs 
(“When the market crashed Oct. 19, 1987, sending the Dow Jones industrial average down 508 
points to 1,738.34, the blue chips had lost 938 points, or 36.1 percent, since reaching a then-
record close of 2,722.42 on Aug. 25, 1987. It took just over 15 months for the Dow to get back 
to its pre-crash level, and almost two years to the day — Aug. 24, 1989 — to reach a new closing 
high, 2,734.64.”) 
45 Richard A. Brealey & Stewart C. Myers, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 365–
66 (6th ed. 2000); Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on the 
Market Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 915–16 (1989).  Recent work shows that once a 
decline began, the computers of institutional investors began to sell out their own holdings.  
Unfortunately, this massive simultaneous selling only exacerbated the decline. John A. Prestbo, 
A Surprising Legacy of the 1987 Crash: the ETF, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 8, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-surprising-legacy-of-the-1987-crash-the-etf-1507515300.  See 
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stocks fell in proportion to their beta factors, thus retaining relative 
relationships to each other, but that theory only avoids the larger issue of 
whether stocks were fairly priced with respect to other available 
investments.  Since we can only value homogeneous things comparatively 
by their prices, it is an impossible task.46  More importantly, however, 
especially for an individual stockholder, a decline in the price of a stock 
he or she owns does not significantly reduce the investment alternatives 
for that investor, because all other shares have been similarly reduced in 
price.47  We cannot say the same for an investor who wants to sell shares 
to buy a home, however.48  What we can say is that stock market declines 
create a “wealth effect” where individuals feel less well off, and tend to 
curb some expenditures, and reduce the market value of the objects of 
those purchases.49  In that sense, all investment assets rise and fall 
together.50  So the premise of distrust for market valuations was flawed in 
Munds, as we now know, but persists to this day. 
 
The Munds opinion introduced the requirement that the dissenter be 
paid the “intrinsic value” of his shares, a term that has created confusion 
for generations.  It should be noted that the court’s “moment’s reflection” 
by a “casual observer” has now been replaced by generations of careful 
theory and evidence of markets and valuation by brilliant, and in some 
cases, Nobel Laureate financial economists, validating efficient capital 
markets in the scientific literature, but not in the courts.51  The notion that 
markets must be wrong on any given day is a common one, often held by 
such “casual observers.”  It persisted in the Delaware Court of Chancery 
as late as 2016.52  It appears to exist in the decisions in other jurisdictions 
                                                                                                                       
also Ben Eisen et al., The Dow’s Darkest Day, 30 Years Later, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 2017, at 
B12. 
46 See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly 
Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761 (1985) (discussing, among other 
things, that markets are efficient, but only in relatively). 
47 Fischel, supra note 45, at 914–17. One qualification is required – all traded securities 
move in the direction of the overall market only to the extent of each stock’s beta – its correlation 
with the market. 
48 Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 46, at 765, 768–69. 
49 See generally  James M. Poterba, Stock Market Wealth and Consumption, 14 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 99 (2000). 
50 We will not belabor the truth of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) here. See  
Brealey & Myers, supra note 45, at 375 (“Lesson 6: Seen One Stock, Seen Them All”). 
51 See generally  JAMES H. LORIE, ET AL., THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND 
EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1985).  The list of Nobel laureates includes Eugene F. Fama, Lars Peter 
Hansen, Robert J. Shiller, Robert C. Merton, Myron S. Scholes, Harry M. Markowitz, Merton 
H. Miller, William F. Sharpe, Franco Modigliani and James Tobin. 
52 In re Appraisal of DFC Glob. Corp., No. 10107–CB, 2016 WL 3753123 (Del. Ch. 
July 8, 2016), rev’d sub nom. DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 
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as well.53  This is a classic example of the Nirvana fallacy of comparing 
an imperfect world to a nonexistent perfect one—which assumes biased 
and polarized experts are wiser judges of value than informed market 
participants using their own funds (who have their own financial 
experts).54  Given the strong preference for expert testimony or deal prices 
over solid market evidence prior to a deal’s announcement in Delaware 
appraisal cases, one is tempted to conclude that the Delaware courts have 
rarely seen a market that they liked or trusted.  
 
B. The Analogy to Liquidation 
 
As previously noted, the origins of appraisal lie in the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court’s original analogy to a corporate liquidation, creating a 
basis for departure from unanimous consent requirements.55  While 
Delaware has not expressed the same analogy, the Delaware Supreme 
Court rejected market value as a measure of value of shares in Tri-
Continental Corp. v. Battye, with the court defining the value of shares, 
not as the publicly traded price, but “the value of the stockholder’s 
                                                                                                                       
368–70 (Del. 2017) (where the Court of Chancery was reversed for rejecting market values in 
part as unreliable due to risks and uncertainties about a company’s future caused by regulatory 
threats).  On reversal, the Supreme Court, while noting that the market price of DFC varied 
widely as it reflected new risks, only required an explanation of how much weight to give the 
deal price that was supported by the record.  See also In re Appraisal of Dell, Inc., No. 9322-
VCL, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, at *106–08 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2016) (citing market myopia 
focused on short-term results and a supposed “anchoring bias,” despite numerous analysts 
valuing the company and its plans, and despite shopping the company to sophisticated financial 
buyers).  This was rejected on appeal.  Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund 
Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 27–28 (Del. 2017). 
53 Fischel, supra note 45, at n.3; see also Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., The Impact of 
Modern Finance Theory in Acquisition Cases, 53 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 22 tbl.5 (2003) 
(illustrating methodologies to calculate appraisal valuations accepted by non-Delaware courts). 
54 Fischel, supra note 45, at 915.  While experts may not have intentional bias, litigants 
do, and we can be certain that no expert who arrives at an unfavorable valuation for his or her 
client will be employed at trial. 
55 Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R.R., 30 Pa. 42, 49 (Pa. 1858).  In part the analogy was 
to an action in partition among co-owners of real property. The liquidation exception to 
unanimous consent lay in the concept of frustration of the purpose of an agreement, described 
by Morawetz as a corporation “becom[ing] hopelessly insolvent, or unable to carry on its 
business except at a loss . . . .”  MORAWETZ, supra note 16, § 412, at 390.  Note that current 
bankruptcy law allows individual creditors who dissent from a proposed corporate 
reorganization to block confirmation of a plan of reorganization only if the plan provides them 
with less than the liquidation value of their claims. Dissent by a minority does not entitle 
individual dissenting creditors to share in the firm’s going concern value in excess of the 
liquidation value or to participate in the gains to the going concern value that flow from the 
reorganization.  See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2012).  
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proportionate interest” as “the true or intrinsic value of his stock . . . .”56  
The court did not define intrinsic value, but discussed all imaginable 
elements that a court might consider, in essence giving courts wide 
discretion and no guidance about intrinsic value.57  Nor was there ever a 
mention of the relative materiality of various measures of value, a term 
that remains missing to this day.58 
 
While one can infer that in this case of a closed-end mutual fund 
“intrinsic value” means to value the stock at the current market value of 
the fund’s investments rather than the typically discounted value of the 
fund (presumably on account of agency costs), none of this was explained 
by the court.  The idea that market value is an unfair measure misses the 
point that most investors in closed-end funds invested at a discount 
reflecting these agency costs, so getting out at a discount reflecting these 
same costs is both fair and exactly what they bargained for. Obviously, 
there are agency costs in any mutual fund, part of which an investor can 
avoid only by doing his own stock-picking, which carries its own often 
higher costs.59 
 
The term “intrinsic” has never been defined by the court, except 
perhaps tautologically as “going concern value,” which itself the court has 
never defined in economic terms.60  In Poole v. N. V. Deli Maatschappij, 
                                                                                                                       
56 Tri-Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del 1950). 
57 “The basic concept of value under the appraisal statute is that the stockholder is 
entitled to be paid for that which has been taken from him, viz., his proportionate interest in a 
going concern.  By value of the stockholder's proportionate interest in the corporate enterprise 
is meant the true or intrinsic value of his stock which has been taken by the merger.  In 
determining what figure represents this true or intrinsic value, the appraiser and the courts must 
take into consideration all factors and elements which reasonably might enter into the fixing of 
value.  Thus, market value, asset value, dividends, earning prospects, the nature of the enterprise 
and any other facts which were known or which could be ascertained as of the date of merger 
and which throw any light on future prospects of the merged corporation are not only pertinent 
to an inquiry as to the value of the dissenting stockholders' interest, but must be considered by 
the agency fixing the value."  Id. 
58 The Dell court did refer to probative value, however. Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. 
Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 31, 35 (Del. 2017). 
59 The loss of scale economies of mutual funds raises information search costs and 
diversification costs for individual investors.  Index funds provide a different model with much 
reduced costs, but do not engage in attempting to pick winners and losers.  It should be noted 
that all firms are affected by agency costs.  Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory 
of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 
(1976). 
60 Going concern value is typically defined as the value of a company as a going concern, 
as opposed to its liquidation value, which simply values the firm’s assets without assessing how 
their assembly might lead to greater earning value for the firm.  Going-Concern Value, 
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the Supreme Court conceded (correctly) that “going-concern asset value 
is comparatively an ethereal concept, and the appraisal thereof is a highly 
speculative and conjectural process.”61  The use of this ethereal term 
continued in Smith v. Van Gorkom, where the court faulted the board for 
being “uninformed as to the intrinsic value of the Company.”62  Chief 
Justice Strine has recently tried to put lipstick on this financial pig by 
calling it a “jurisprudential” concept, without further detail about what that 
means.63 
 
 Indeterminacy has been an ongoing problem in Delaware 
corporate law.64  Multipart tests with weighting left to the discretion of 
each judge only exacerbate this problem.  Stephen Bainbridge’s recent 
paper reviews the various interest group explanations for this 
phenomenon, and while he credits some of them, he adds one of his own: 
that “all judges have a powerful self-interest in maximizing their 
reputation. . . .” and that “the mandatory indeterminacy of Delaware’s 
judicially created corporate law likewise follows from judicial concern for 
reputation.”65  To paraphrase, the prominence of the judicial role is 
maximized under uncertainty because of the necessity to litigate similar 
issues with small distinctions repeatedly, and to turn to these judges time 
and again.  Determinations of “intrinsic value” have become a magnet for 
such litigation.  One might term “intrinsic value” little more than a judicial 
conceit rather than a clear principle for private compliance that is feasible 
to operationalize.  Albert Choi and Eric Talley have argued for the current 
practice, on the theory that both parties to a merger will be influenced by 
the expected appraisal valuation.66  This ignores the indeterminacy of a 
                                                                                                                       
INVESTOPEDIA (last visited June 23, 2017), 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/going_concern_value.asp. 
61 Poole v. N. V. Deli Maatschappij, 243 A.2d 67, 72 (Del. 1965). 
62 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985).  Daniel Fischel characterized 
this decision as "surely one of the worst decisions in the history of corporate law . . . ." Daniel 
R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 BUS. L. 1437, 1455 
(1985).  
63 DFC Global Corporation v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P, 172 A.3d 367 (Del. 2017), 
cited in Dell, 177 A.3d at 36. 
64 William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law’s 
Continuing Success, 2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1, 15–17 (2009). 
65 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interest Group Analysis of Delaware Law: The Corporate 
Opportunity Doctrine as Case Study, 22–24 UCLA Sch. of Law, Law—Econ. Research Paper 
No. 17-01 (Feb. 22, 2017), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2894577.  
66 Albert Choi and Eric Talley, Appraising the “Merger Price” Appraisal Rule, 35 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming 2019), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2888420 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2888420. 
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multi-part test with no guidelines for weighting.  Our evidence reveals how 
difficult predicting appraisal valuation has been, and how generally 
profitable appraisal arbitrage has become.67  Scholars of law and 
economics have mistakenly focused on the deal, ignoring the fact that the 
statute instructs courts to ignore the deal and focus on the value of the 
company exclusive of the effects of anticipation or realization of the deal.  
This leads to ex post experts second-guessing the ex-ante experts 
employed by selling firm directors who must deal with the realities of the 
existing market. 
 
C. Leaving the Term “Value” Open 
 
  As previously discussed, Delaware’s early statute did not specify 
how value was to be determined.68  The use of the open term “value” surely 
was intended to include the long-standing “fair market value,” in Delaware 
as well as elsewhere.69  In an era before large volumes of trades and a 
constant flow of material information about companies and large numbers 
of financial analysts, one can only speculate about what methods 
appraisers employed.  In more primitive times, some courts accepted par 
value of shares as their value.70  In Chicago Corp. v. Munds, under such a 
                                                                                                                       
They argue that “the appraisal right helps protect against unfair and inefficient transfers 
to lower valuing buyers . . . .”  See also  Audra Boone et al., Merger Negotiations in the shadow 
of Judicial Appraisal, Indiana Legal Studies Research Paper No. 381 (June 11, 2018), available 
at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3039040 and Charles Korsmo & Minor 
Myers, Reforming Modern Appraisal Litigation, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 279, 322 (2016).  But see 
Paul G. Mahoney & Mark Weinstein, The Merger Remedy and Merger Premiums, 1 AM. L. & 
ECON. REV. 239, 242 (1999) (reviewing pre-arbitrage evidence and finding no differences 
because of access to appraisal).   But after an efficient search for the highest bidder, where is a 
higher bidder to be found?  Choi and Talley argue that the sale price anticipates judicial treatment 
of appraisal.  Our difficulty here is that the appraisal evidence of expert testimony shows wide, 
some might say wild, variations, that do not match or predict judicial outcomes. See Appendix 
A.  In effect, this makes appraisal something of a lottery, albeit one with a virtually guaranteed 
payoff above the risk-free rate. More fundamentally, these authors ignore the limits of the 
statute.   
67 One notable exception is In re Appraisal of SWS Group, Inc., 2017 WL 2334852 
(Del. Ch. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Merlin v. Sws Group, 2018 Del. LEXIS 77, where the court 
found a fair value of $6.38 per share, while the deal price was $6.92.  See also ACP Master, Ltd. 
v. Sprint Corp., 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125, 2017 WL 3105858, where the court found a fair 
value of $2.13 per share compared to a deal price of $5.00, on the basis of a discounted cash 
flow analysis. 
68 See  discussion supra p. 2. 
69 Poole v. N. V. Deli Maatschappij, 243 A.2d 67, 70, 72 (Del. 1965). 
70 Barnett v. Philadelphia Market Co., 67 A. 912, 913 (Pa. 1907). 
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statute, the appraisers “took evidence upon the earnings of the corporation, 
its prospects, reproduction value, asset value, market quotations, etc.”71 
While there was a trading market for the shares, the court noted 
approvingly that “[t]he appraisers, having made a full examination of the 
status of the company and its prospects, are in a better position to gauge 
the fair value of the stock than the outside public."72  In 1934, when 
investors were licking their wounds, at the onset of federal securities 
regulation and disclosure requirements, there might have been a grain of 
truth in this, but that day is long past, in the era of efficient capital markets 
dominated by sophisticated institutional investors and high speed traders 
that arbitrage away tiny price differences between markets.  By the 1950s, 
this rejection of market prices was accepted doctrine, and valuation 
somehow morphed from a question of fact for the appraisers to become a 
question of law for the court to determine—oddly described by today’s 
Supreme Court as “jurisprudence.”73 
 
D. Edging Bets: Consider “Everything” 
 
What began as a search for the holy grail of “intrinsic value” 
allowed consideration of virtually anything—sometimes, but not always, 
including market value.  The weighting of these factors when courts 
exercised their discretion was wildly inconsistent, a problem that 
continues today, albeit in a somewhat more modern form.74  The one thing 
it did not permit was consideration of expected future earnings, on the 
basis that this was speculative, and not based on existing facts.75  This 
approach excludes the evidence most relied upon by investors, who are not 
buying past earnings, and do not believe that the past always predicts the 
future.  The duPont case was perhaps the most egregious example.  A film 
maker had just discovered new value in its fully amortized film library due 
to the onset of television’s voracious appetite for new material, including 
                                                                                                                       
71 Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 172 A. 452, 456 (Del. Ch. 1934). 
72 Id. at 456. 
73 Francis I. duPont & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 312 A.2d 344, 348 (Del. Ch. 
1973), aff’d 334 A.2d 216 (Del. 1975); DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P, 172 
A.3d 346, 368 (Del. 2017). 
74 Comment, Valuation of Dissenters’ Stock under Appraisal Statutes, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 
1453, 1469 (1966), shows Delaware Block allocations to market value ranging between 25 and 
45%, to asset value between 20 and 50%, and earnings value between 25 and 80%. Similar 
variances appeared in a later study, Note, 30 OKL L. REV. 629 (1977). 
75 See, e.g.,  duPont, 312 A.2d at 348–49.  For a criticism of the former “Delaware 
Block” methodology, see David Cohen, Comment: Valuation in the Context of Share Appraisal, 
34 EMORY L.J. 117 (1985). 
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full length feature films.76  Rather than capitalize expected future earnings, 
as markets would, and did, the court approved a capitalization based solely 
on an average of the past years’ earnings, which had grown steadily from 
$3.32 per share to $8.02 in the previous five years, thus failing to use the 
trend to make projections of future earnings.77  The court declined to 
include the earnings value of the fully amortized film library in its asset 
calculation, in effect ignoring the “going concern value.”78 
 
The confusion created by considering “asset value” is perhaps best 
exemplified by Poole v. N. V. Deli Maatschappij, where the Supreme 
Court admitted that it had perhaps confused the meaning of “asset value” 
with its own pronouncements, while at the same time denying that they 
were in error, or unclear.79  The court conceded that in valuing stock on a 
going concern basis, it was not clear whether assets’ value was to be 
determined on a going concern basis as opposed to fair market value.80  In 
the particular case this was important because the market value of the 
assets apparently was greater if the company were liquidated and the assets 
put to an alternative and more valuable use.  While the court cited its own 
cases that assets were to be valued on a going concern basis, and not on a 
liquidation basis,81 it then proceeded to claim (correctly) that “going-
concern asset value is comparatively an ethereal concept, and the appraisal 
thereof is a highly speculative and conjectural process.  We are satisfied 
that fair market value, so well formulated in the law of eminent domain, 
furnishes a more concrete and workable rule for appraisers, lawyers, and 
judges (emphasis added).”82  Then in the next breath the court took back 
much of what it had just concluded, citing Fletcher: 
 
Net asset value is entitled to weight, but it must be 
remembered that an appraisal is not a liquidation, and that 
the stock must be appraised on a going concern basis with 
                                                                                                                       
 76 See  duPont, 312 A.2d at 347–49. 
77 Id. at 348. 
78 Id. at 351.  Following Poole v. N. V. Deli Maatschappij, 243 A.2d 67 (Del. 1965), the 
court held that “any allowance for the earning power of the assets . . . is best left to the court’s 
consideration of earnings as an independent element of stock value.”  But of course, the only 
consideration was retrospective, where averaging included periods when the film library was 
not being fully utilized. 
79 Poole, 243 A.2d at 70. 
80 Id.  
81 Id. at 70–71 (citing Heller v. Munsingwear, Inc., 33 Del. Ch. 593, 98 A.2d 774 
(1953)); Sporburg v. City Specialty Stores, 35 Del. Ch. 560, 123 A.2d 121 (1956); Levin v. 
Midland Ross Corp., 41 Del. Ch. 276, 194 A.2d 50 (1963). 
82 Poole, 243 A.2d at 72. 
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the possibility in different cases that the value of the stock 
may be substantially above or below net asset value or 
break-up value.  The nature of the business, the nature of 
the assets, their liquidity, and profitable use, are factors 
bearing upon the weight to be given to net asset value.83 
 
One can only speculate what this wisdom might have meant in Tri-
Continental Corp. v. Battye if it had been considered carefully.  A closed-
end investment fund rarely sells at its net asset value, largely because of 
agency costs, including the brokerage fees of trading and the costs of 
analysts.84  Liquidation would nearly always produce a higher net asset 
value.  How does one reconcile these values?  The cost of voluntary exit 
for an investor includes search costs for new stocks and the brokerage 
costs involved in reinvestment and leaves the investor with less 
diversification unless another fund (with its own agency costs) is chosen.  
There is a lesson here (ignored by the courts); investors purchase shares in 
closed-end companies recognizing the agency costs and recognizing that 
an exit will be at the market value of the fund’s shares, rather than at full 
liquidation value.  Apparently, investors believe this is “fair,” since they 
were on notice of these facts at the time of purchase and are willing to pay 
a price for managed diversification. 
 
While Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., rejected the rigidity of Francis I. 
duPont and allowed judicial admission of evidence based on modern 
methods of valuation, it continued the hedging process, thus minimizing 
the impact of real market values.85  The court stated that all the older 
                                                                                                                       
83 Id. (citing 15 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS (perm. ed.) 305)). 
84 Thomas A. Smith, A Capital Markets Approach to Mass Tort Bankruptcy, 104 YALE 
L.J. 367, 412–13, n. 142 (1994) (citing, inter alia, Abraham Abraham et al., Does Sentiment 
Explain Closed-End Fund Discounts? Evidence from the Bond Funds, 28 FIN. REV. 607 (1993) 
(recounting long-standing puzzle of closed-end fund discounts and arguing that existence of 
small premiums for closed-end bond funds suggests that discounts are not due to systematic 
risk)); Kenneth J. Boudreaux, Discounts and Premiums on Closed-End Mutual Funds: A Study 
in Valuation, 28 J. FIN. 515 (1973); James A. Brickley & James S. Schallheim, Lifting the Lid 
on Closed-End Investment Companies: A Case of Abnormal Returns, 20 J. FIN. & 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 107 (1985). For a general discussion of agency costs, see Jensen & 
Meckling, supra note 59. 
85 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). Two commentators argue that 
Weinberger was the beginning of the shift to an emphasis on a fair deal price (not just above the 
pre-bid market), which has spread beyond conflict of interest transactions to all deals.  Mahoney 
& Weinstein, supra note 66, at 240.  We are less certain, since the phrase “intrinsic value” 
appears much earlier. See, e.g., Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 20 Del. Ch. 142, 150–51 (1934); Tri-
Continental Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del 1950); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 
866 (Del. 1985).    
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elements must also be considered.86  In Pinson v. Campbell-Taggart, Inc., 
the court approved a weighted value based upon the discounted value of 
earnings at 75% and book value of assets (an irrelevant historical figure) 
of 25%.87  This only encouraged the confusion which continues to this day.  
Cases employing net asset value as one measure persist.88  Older cases 
employed what appear to be random weightings of asset value, market 
value, earnings value and in a few cases, dividend value.89  That process 
persists.90   In DFC Global, Vice Chancellor Bouchard gave equal weight 
to a discounted cash flow value of $13.10, the comparable companies 
analysis offered by DFC Global’s expert, and the deal price.  On appeal 
Chief Justice Strine stated, “the Court of Chancery must exercise its 
considerable discretion while also explaining, with reference to the 
economic facts before it and corporate finance principles, why it is 
according a certain weight to a certain indicator of value.”91  While 
emphasizing the importance of judicial discretion in weighing “all relevant 
factors,” the opinion ignored the crucial importance and overwhelming 
materiality of the pre-deal stock price, while ironically reciting that 
“averaging of market prices on the last trading day before the 
announcement of a merger will reflect the fair market price.”92  This error 
was repeated in Justice Valihura’s opinion in Dell.93  Does this mean that 
fair market price cannot be fair value? 
                                                                                                                       
86 “By value of the stockholder's proportionate interest in the corporate enterprise is 
meant the true or intrinsic value of his stock which has been taken by the merger. In determining 
what figure represents this true or intrinsic value, the appraiser and the courts must take into 
consideration all factors and elements which reasonably might enter into the fixing of value. 
Thus, market value, asset value, dividends, earning prospects, the nature of the enterprise and 
any other facts which were known or which could be ascertained as of the date of merger and 
which throw any light on future prospects of the merged corporation are not only pertinent to an 
inquiry as to the value of the dissenting stockholders' interest, but must be considered by the 
agency fixing the value.” 457 A.2d at 713 (quoting Battye, 74 A.2d, at 72). 
87 C.A. No. 7499, 1989 WL 17438, at *3, reprinted in 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1095. 
88 Ng v. Heng Sang Realty Corp., 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 69, at *24; Highfields Capital, 
Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. Ch. 2007); Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event 
Driven Master Fund, Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 36 (Del. 2017) (quoting Battye, 74 A.2d at 72). 
89 Note, The Dissenting Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy, 30 OKL. L. REV. 629, 640–
41 (1977). 
90 In re Appraisal of DFC Global Inc., No. 10107-CB, 2016 WL 3753123 at *14–15 
(Del. Ch. July 8, 2016); Id. at *2. 
91 Is this asking the trial court to explain the inexplicable? DFC Global Corp., v. 
Muirfield Value Partners, 172 A.3d 346, 388 (Del. 2017). 
92 DFC Global Corporation v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P. 172 A.3d at 365 n.95 citing 
EDWARD P. WELCH ET AL., FOLK ON THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW § 262.10 
at 9—229 (6th ed. 2017).. 
93 In re Appraisal of Dell at *48 (“[The statute] vests the Chancellor and Vice 
Chancellors with significant discretion to consider ‘all relevant factors’ and determine the going 
concern value of the underlying company.”) citing Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Glob. GT LP 
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Chief Justice Strine correctly dismissed prima facie reliance on the 
deal price as the best estimate of value, as having no basis in the statute, 
“which gives the Court of Chancery in the first instance the discretion to 
‘determine the fair value of the shares’ by taking into account all relevant 
factors.”94  Here, the Chief Justice confuses relevance and materiality, 
which has to do with the weight (probative value) to be attached to a 
particular piece of evidence.  In view of the statutory exclusion of Section 
262(h), the truly irrelevant and immaterial evidence is the deal price itself.  
He then went on to note the length and openness of the seller’s search, the 
lack of conflicts, and said that under these conditions “economic principles 
suggest that the best evidence of fair value was the deal price.”95  As the 
court stated, “the market’s collective judgment of the effect of regulatory 
risk . . .  is more likely to be correct than any individual’s guess.  When 
the collective judgment involved, as it did here, not just the views of 
company stockholders, but also those of potential buyers of the entire 
company . . . there is more, not less, reason to give weight to the market’s 
view of an important factor.”96  The only problem is that given Section 
262(h)’s exclusion, the relevant time for respect of market prices was 
before the deal was announced or anticipated. 
 
The opinion observes that DFC’s argument on appeal in favor of a 
judicial presumption in favor of deal value where the price was the product 
of sufficient market conditions was not presented fairly to the Court of 
Chancery.  The Supreme Court could have relied on this ground to reject 
the argument on appeal, but instead gratuitously rejected it on other 
grounds, based largely on precedent, and a judicial clinging to its 
discretionary powers first generated in the 1930s in Tri-Continental Corp 
v. Battye.  The opinion only questioned the discretion of the particular 
weighting, not that the Court of Chancery failed to give the deal price 
sufficient weight or explain why it relied on other factors.  There was no 
mention of exclusion of anticipated or realized effects of the deal on value, 
thus ignoring Section 262(h)’s exclusionary command.  Similarly, in Dell 
the court did not insist on the deal price or the pre-bid market price as 
determinative.97 
 
                                                                                                                       
(Golden Telecom II), 11 A.3d 214, 217–18 (Del. 2010); DFC Global Corp., 172 A.3d at 348; 
Id. at 349. 
94 DFC Global Corp., 172 A.3d at 349 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h)). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 See  Dell, Inc., v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1 (Del. 
2017); DFC Global Corp., 172 A.3d at 352.  
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The DFC opinion notes the efficiency of the trading market for 
DFC’s shares, both in the size of the float and the responsiveness of its 
stock price to various regulatory initiatives, as did the Dell opinion.  A 
stock price chart documented the volatility of price in view of both high 
leverage and successive regulatory risks.  But the Supreme Court’s opinion 
ignored these facts, and, in discussing the possible unreliability of deal 
prices, ignored the widely accepted reliability of market prices.98  Most of 
the Supreme Court opinion was devoted to a detailed analysis of the Court 
of Chancery’s fair value analysis, and recites at length the positions of the 
experts, their disagreements, and the trial court’s resolution of these 
differences.  We can only wonder why experts who apply models based 
on accurate market descriptions can be allowed to apply assumptions the 
market has apparently rejected, such as the beta, the equity premium, 
expected earnings growth and others.  The Dell opinion was more 
skeptical of expert opinions on value, although it left it to the experts to 
provide evidence on the size of the deduction for deal synergies.99 
 
E. Finally Recognizing Market Value 
 
We began writing this article as an unalloyed criticism of the court’s 
lack of recognition of market value as the best measure of the statutory 
command to exclude anticipated or realized effects of the merger.  Until 
February of 2018, this was a fair assessment, in our view.  But Vice 
Chancellor Laster’s recent opinion in Arubahas required an amendment to 
our thesis.  Whether it will stand up on appeal remains open as we write 
this, but its logic is so powerful that it would be difficult to reverse it, 
although it is possible that the Delaware Supreme Court might continue to 
recite its mantra about the courts’ discretion.  As Vice Chancellor Laster 
wrote, in the context of discussing dissenters’ complaints about whether 
the negotiators had obtained the highest possible price, or were 
compromised: 
                                                                                                                       
98 “But, not only do we see no license in the statute for creating a presumption that the 
resulting price in such a situation is the ‘exclusive,’ ‘best,’ or ‘primary’ evidence of fair value, 
we do not share DFC’s confidence in our ability to craft, on a general basis, the precise pre-
conditions that would be necessary to invoke a presumption of that kind.”  DFC Global Corp., 
172 A.3d at 366. 
99 The court noted at petitioners’ expert asserted fair value was more than twice the deal 
price, Dell Inc., 172 A.3d at *26–27, which the trial court noted lacked credibility on its face. 
Id. at *69–70. At the same time, without reference to pre-bid market values, the trial court was 
charged with determining the value of synergies.  Id. at *39. 
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In a scenario where the underlying market price is 
reliable, competition and negotiation become secondary. 
Under these circumstances, an arm’s-length deal at a 
premium over the market is non-exploitive.  By 
definition, it gives stockholders ‘what would fairly be 
given to them in an arm’s-length transaction.’100 
 
III. HOW MODERN FINANCIAL KNOWLEDGE HAS CHANGED 
VALUATION 
 
A. Efficient Capital Markets 
 
We now turn to the vast body of knowledge about how financial 
markets operate and set prices to reflect the current consensus about 
value.101  Here we will only summarize much of this knowledge, to set the 
stage for answering the question of, in terms of Delaware law, what does 
“fair value” mean? 
 
Theories and evidence about investor choices and behavior center on 
how participants in capital markets process new information.102  It would 
be redundant to repeat all of the evidence in support of what Michael 
Jensen has called one of the best established propositions in all of the 
social sciences: the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis.103  Beginning 
with research that established that stock price movements are 
unpredictable, researchers were able to infer that stock markets were 
efficient in a weak form—that nothing in the sequence of past stock prices 
enabled us to predict future price movements.104  From that, researchers 
proceeded to test stronger claims of market efficiency.  The semi-strong 
                                                                                                                       
100 Aruba, 2018 WL 922139 at *95–96. 
101 The DFC opinion made brief reference to this consensus. DFC Global Corp., at 373 
n.144 (“In an efficient market you can trust prices, for they impound all available information 
about the value of each security.” (quoting RICHARD A. BREALEY ET. AL., PRINCIPLES OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE 214 (2008)).  However, the Dell court concluded that the market for the 
stock was semi-strong form efficient. Dell Inc., 172 A.3d at *7. 
102 See  William Carney, Signalling and Causation in Insider Trading, 36 CATH. UNIV. 
L. REV. 863 (1987). 
103 Michael Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence, 4, No. 2 
MIDLAND J. CORP. FIN. 6, 11 (Summer, 1986).  For extensive early surveys, see, e.g., Eugene 
Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970); 
Irwin Friend, The Economic Consequences of the Stock Market, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 212 (1972); 
Sanford J. Grossman, On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets Where Traders Have 
Diverse Information, 31 J. FIN. 573 (1976).  
104 LORIE, ET AL., supra note 51, at 70–79. 
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form asserted that all publicly available information about issuers was 
reflected in stock prices, while the strong form asserted that all such 
information, public or not, was reflected.105  The Supreme Court in DFC 
Global noted the widespread acceptance (and evidence in support) of this 
learning:106 
 
Market prices are typically viewed as superior to other 
valuation techniques because, unlike, e.g., a single 
person’s discounted cash flow model, the market price 
should distill the collective judgment and wisdom of the 
many based on all the publicly available information 
about a given company and the value of its shares.  
Indeed, the relationship between market valuation and 
fundamental valuation has been strong historically.  As 
one textbook puts it, “[i]n an efficient market you can trust 
prices, for they impound all available information about 
the value of each security.”  More pithily: “For many 
purposes no formal theory of value is needed.  We can 
take the market’s word for it.”  But, a single person’s own 
estimates of the cash flows are just that, a good faith 
estimate by a single, reasonably informed person to 
predict the future [subject to all the perils of bias and 
inaccurate assumptions shown by competing experts in 
appraisal cases, as demonstrated in Exhibit A107].  Thus, a 
singular discounted cash flow model is often most helpful 
only when there isn’t an observable market price.108 
 
 
                                                                                                                       
105 Id. at 71. We note in passing that the strong form has not been widely accepted, while 
the semi-strong form has. 
106 DFC Global Inc., v. Muirfield Value Partners, 172 A.3d 346, 369–70 (Del. 2017); In 
re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 2016 WL 3186538 at *24 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2016). Vice Chancellor 
Laster dismissed market prices by quoting then Vice Chancellor Strine to the effect that “even 
for purposes of determining the value of individual shares, where the stock market is typically 
thick and liquid, the proponents of the efficient capital markets hypothesis no longer make the 
strong-form claim that the market price actually determines fundamental value; at most they 
make the semi-strong claim that market prices reflect all available information and are efficient 
at incorporating new information.” He ignored the fact that Dell had been widely publicizing its 
plans and projections, and mentions no inside information concealed from the public. 
107 JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER 
THAN THE FEW AND HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES, 
AND NATIONS (Doubleday & Anchor eds., 2004). 
108 DFC Global Corp., v. Muirfield Value Partners, 172 A.3d 346, 369–70 (Del. 2017). 
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For these reasons, corporate finance theory reflects a belief that if 
an asset—such as the value of a company as reflected in the trading value 
of its stock—can be subject to close examination and bidding by many 
humans with an incentive to estimate its future cash flows value, the 
resulting collective judgment as to value is likely to be highly informative 
and that, all estimators having equal access to public information, the 
likelihood of outguessing the market over time and building a portfolio of 
stocks beating it is slight.109 
 
B. Exploring the Efficient Capital Market Paradox 
 
Despite the widespread acceptance of stock market efficiency, the 
Supreme Court remains reluctant to treat this evidence with the respect 
called for by its power.  The DFC opinion gives two reasons: (1) the 
statute: “We decline to engage in that act of creation, which in our view 
has no basis in the statutory text, which gives the Court of Chancery in the 
first instance the discretion to ‘determine the fair value of the shares’ by 
taking into account ‘all relevant factors’”; and (2) the singular importance 
of judicial discretion.110  At the same time, the opinion rejects the rules of 
evidence that require consideration of the materiality of evidence and the 
weight to be accorded to it as well as its relevance.  Later, the opinion 
attempts to explain why the only material evidence of value is to be 
discounted: “the definition of fair value used in appraisal cases is a 
jurisprudential concept that has certain nuances that neither an economist 
nor market participant would usually consider . . . .”111  One can only 
wonder why, if no one in the real world considers these immaterial 
elements of value, the courts feel that they must do so.  Moreover, the 
opinion does not identify these nuances, or the role materiality should play 
in weighing evidence.  No explanation is given why market prices should 
not be trusted whenever available, nor of what nuances the court refers to.  
We attempt to explore some possibilities below.  Without some specific 
“nuances,” lawyers and lower court judges are left to speculate.  This 
indeterminacy has been criticized by one of us in other settings.112  It leads 
to the uncertainty created by courts of equity that have long been criticized 
                                                                                                                       
109 See, e.g.,  BRADFORD CORNELL, CORPORATE VALUATION: TOOLS FOR EFFECTIVE 
APPRAISAL AND DECISION MAKING 35–38 (Amy Hollands et al. eds., 1993). 
110 DFC Global Corporation v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P. 172 A.3d at 346. 
111 Id. at 367. 
112 Carney & Shepherd, supra note 3, at 11. 
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for being as arbitrary as the length of “a Chancellor’s foot.”113  And so 
indeed equity appears to be in appraisal cases. 
 
Here we address the lingering suspicions that markets do not always 
price every stock efficiently, as we noted above in discussing the efficient 
market paradox.  Gilson and Kraakman used the example of issuance of 
an innovative security, where no one other than the issuer may fully 
understand its value at the time of issue.114  One common example is the 
post-market price reaction to an initial public offering of common stock, 
where prices typically rise after the IPO, as investor uncertainty is 
generally assuaged with reactions of more knowledgeable investors and 
subsequent information.   
 
When an issuer first announces such an innovative 
security, all traders will be uncertain about its worth. 
Although the issuer may make good-faith representations 
about value, most traders will discount these as self-
interested puffery.  Absent convincing assurances, the 
initial pricing of the innovative security will be left to the 
uninformed trading mechanism, which will tend to 
"undervalue" it relative to the information possessed by 
the good-faith issuer -- but not, of course, relative to the 
aggregate forecasts of the uninformed traders. Thus, the 
security's uninformed equilibrium price will be "biased," 
and relatively inefficient. Efficiency is possible only if the 
issuer succeeds in making its representations credible, or 
if an enterprising trader independently acquires the key 
facts that establish their accuracy. In the first case, 
subsequent price equilibration would proceed rapidly 
through the universally informed or professionally 
informed trading mechanisms; in the second, it would 
proceed more slowly through derivatively informed 
trading.115 
                                                                                                                       
113 John Selden, TABLE TALK 43 (Pollock ed., 1927) (“Equity is a roguish thing. For 
Law we have a measure, know what to trust to; Equity is according to the conscience of him that 
is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is Equity. 'T is all one as if they should make 
the standard for the measure we call a "foot" a Chancellor's foot; what an uncertain measure 
would this be! One Chancellor has a long foot, another a short foot, a third an indifferent foot. 
'T is the same thing in the Chancellor's conscience.”). 
114 Ronald Gilson & Renier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. 
L. REV. 549, 585 (1984).  
115 Id.  
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This market inefficiency can exist in various settings.  One is where 
markets fail to dive deeply into research about a company to predict 
accurately its future earnings and profits.  Warren Buffet is notable 
because he ignores the short term variance risk measured by beta and used 
by finance expert witnesses, to focus on longer term prospects, which he 
calls “focus investing.”116  In another example, one of the authors was a 
director of a biotechnology company, Pharmasset, Inc., with several 
complex compounds with the potential to treat (or cure) one or more viral 
diseases.117  While the company made regular releases of definitive 
clinical testing information when available, management and the directors 
generally believed that the company’s stock was undervalued.  Many 
analysts seemed superficial in their work, and when one wrote a report 
with a detailed analysis of the risks and potential of a lead compound that 
the CEO said he could have written, the stock moved quickly upward.  But 
complexity and uncertainty continued to dog the stock’s price, until one 
sophisticated company working in the antiviral area, Gilead Sciences, 
made a first bid that triggered a diligent search for the best possible price.  
That price was an 89% premium over the pre-announcement market price, 
which was based on a relatively recent announcement of the latest clinical 
test results.118  Upon announcement, the buyer’s stock price fell, upon a 
consensus that it was paying too much.119  The buyer ultimately priced the 
FDA approved drug at $1,000 per pill ($84,000 per treatment), over twice 
the seller’s best estimates of its price ($36,000), which created a stir in 
Congress and the press.120  At the end, who could say the acquisition price 
was too low?  In hindsight, neither the market nor the seller’s officers or 
directors fully understood the full commercial potential value of the 
seller’s compound.  Forbes magazine later called Gilead’s purchase of 
Pharmasset for $11 billion “one of the best pharma acquisitions ever.”121  
                                                                                                                       
116 See, e.g.,  ROBERT G. HAGSTROM, THE WARREN BUFFETT PORTFOLIO (1999). 
117 See GILDEAD SCIENCES TO ACQUIRE PHARMASSET, INC. FOR $11 BILLION (2011), 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/882095/000119312511317733/d259746dex991.htm. 
118 Jon "DRJ" Najarian, Pharmasett pops on Gilead takeover, YAHOO (Nov. 21, 
2011),  https://www.yahoo.com/news/Pharmasset-pops-Gilead-optmonster-2480362095.html 
(last visited Mar. 29, 2017). 
119 Id.; "Grading Pharma in 2013", FORBES, December 31, 2013.  Pharmasset’s 
experienced legal adviser assured the board that the company would be sued, given the 
uncertainty of the application of Delaware law to such transactions, and two spurious suits 
claiming Revlon violations followed. 
120 Russ Britt, Gilead’s high pricing of Sovaldi draws inquiry from Senate committee, 
MARKETWATCH, (July 11, 2014), http://blogs.marketwatch.com/health-
exchange/2014/07/11/gileads-high-pricing-of-sovaldi-draws-inquiry-from-senate-committee/. 
121 Matthew Herper, Grading Pharma In 2013: 16 Drug Companies Ranked, FORBES, 
(Dec. 31, 2013), https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2013/12/31/grading-pharma-in-
2013-16-drug-companies-ranked/#4b92bd5b3f09. 
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Who could have known this purchase was a bargain?  Only those with 
perfect foresight, which did not include one of these authors, experienced 
pharmaceutical officers and directors, and experienced financial advisors.  
How could a court know this?122 
 
A modest regard for criticisms of market efficiency compels us to 
suggest that the pre-announcement market price should be presumed to be 
the best evidence of fair value, with a heavy burden on those who would 
challenge it—not met in DFC Global or Dell.  As Fischel has stated, 
“market prices are superior to other methods of valuation when market 
prices are available . . . .”123 
  
IV. THE COURTS’ REACTIONS—TOO LITTLE AND TOO FAR 
 
We have noted that the Supreme Court’s DFC Global and Dell 
decisions have edged toward acceptance of deal values as the primary, if 
not exclusive, means of measuring corporate value, while still retaining 
judicial discretion to move away from these valuations under undefined 
circumstances, thus preserving the unpredictable use of “jurisprudence” 
under conditions of uncertainty.  We argue below that well-defined market 
prices—not deal prices—are the only material evidence; everything else, 
however otherwise relevant, becomes immaterial speculation divorced 
from the reality of markets. 
 
We have described the outlines of modern scientific evidence about 
the accuracy of markets in pricing securities.  Summarized, we can say 
that a large number of analysts continually review new information about 
companies, seeking a profitable (if momentary) trading advantage for 
sophisticated institutional investors and traders, and that as a result, all 
stocks are fairly priced with respect to each other considering expected 
risk and returns.  This effect is magnified by high-speed trading, which 
taps into small differences in quoted prices, thus closing many of these 
gaps.  Thus, if one exits one stock, other stocks are readily available with 
similar, if not identical, risk-return profiles, at minuscule transaction costs.  
We can now state with confidence that in efficient capital markets, an 
exiting shareholder who receives the pre-announcement market price, or 
                                                                                                                       
122 Vice Chancellor Laster captured this problem in Dell in describing directors’ search 
duties in sales: “In this formulation, the key verb is ‘sought.’  Time-bound mortals cannot foresee 
the future.”  In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 2016 WL 3186538 at *79 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2016). 
123 Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 BUS. 
LAW. at 941 (1985). 
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more, for her shares has received fair value in compliance with the statute.  
Judicial confusion over the years in distinguishing “fair market value” 
from “fair value” should be set aside as a misleading side road.  In short, 
a heavy burden of proof should face any litigant claiming that an abstract 
valuation model is a better measure of firm value than its market price.  As 
one student author stated: “Maybe Publius Was Right.”124 
 
There are some dissenters from this view.  Lawrence Hamermesh 
and Michael Wachter argue that in a going private merger, if the controller 
wants to minimize the price paid to the minority, the controller may 
depress the market price through wrongdoing, such as deliberate poor 
management.125  There may be cases where a controller has not shared a 
potential business opportunity with the corporation that the controller 
intends to hold until after a cashout merger, in which a challenge to the 
fairness of the pre-bid market price would be appropriate, under the 
Weinberger “entire fairness” doctrine.  In Aruba, petitioners challenged 
the validity of the market price because management deferred announcing 
improved results until the end of the quarter when it included the 
announcement of the merger agreement in its filing, thus blurring the 
separate effects of the earnings and the merger.126  But the court rejected 
any inference of manipulation because shareholders had all  the 
information in making their decision.127 
 
Burton Malkiel, the distinguished financial economist, has 
addressed the issue of investor myopia and potential mispricing of 
securities relied upon in DFC and Dell by the Court of Chancery and 
rejected by the Supreme Court: 
 
These attacks on the efficient market theory are far from 
convincing.  Some of the market patterns discovered may 
                                                                                                                       
124 Daniel E. Myer, Maybe Publius Was Right: Relying on Merger Price to Determine 
Fair Value in Delaware Appraisal Cases, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 153 (2016) (“Every thing [sic] is 
worth what its purchaser will pay for it.” citing PUBLIUS SYRUS, THE MORAL SAYINGS OF 
PUBLIUS SYRUS, A ROMAN SLAVE 71 (D. Lyman, Jr., trans., Cleveland, L. E. Barnard & Co., 
1856) While we agree with this sentiment, it is qualified by the exception in Section 262(h) for 
stocks not widely traded, and by the statutory exception for anticipated results of the merger. 
125 Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Fair Value of Cornfields in 
Delaware Appraisal Law, 31 J. CORP. L. 119, 132 (2005).  
 126 See Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., No. 11448–VCL, 
2018 WL 922139 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018); see also  Veritian Partners Master Fund Ltd. V. 
Aruba Networks, Inc., No. 11448-VCL, 2018 WL 2315943 (Del. Ch, May 21, 2018). 
127  Aruba, No. 11448–VCL, 2018 WL 922139 at *33–34.  See also  Aruba II, ., No. 
11448-VCL, 2018 WL 2315943.  
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have rational causes; others may be spurious.  But none 
of them are dependable in all time periods.  And there is 
no evidence that rational investors can exploit any of the 
alleged mispricing in securities markets to earn above-
average returns.  *     *    *  In summary, I remain skeptical 
that markets are systematically irrational, and that 
knowledge of such irrationalities can lead to profitable 
trading strategies.  Indeed, the more potentially profitable 
a trading strategy is, the less likely it is to survive.128 
 
The appropriate response to corporate wrongdoing is through a 
derivative action, not attempting to reconstruct what a company might 
have been worth under honest management—a form of the Nirvana 
fallacy.  Valuation in an appraisal proceeding could conceivably include 
the value of a derivative action to the company.  Once a merger is 
consummated, former shareholders lack standing to bring derivative 
actions, but at least one court has held that the value of the derivative claim 
may be included in an appraisal valuation.129  If one buys stock in a badly 
managed company, the price the buyer pays is a discount from what it 
would be with better or more honest controllers.  In short, buying in at a 
bargain price and selling out at a bargain price seems fair to the investor.  
And there is evidence that controllers often obtain control to reduce agency 
costs where managers have broad discretion.130 
 
A. Deal Prices Typically Exceed Previous Market Values and Thus 
are Barred by Section 262(h) 
 
The idea that combinations of businesses produce gains from trade 
is hardly a new one.  Nor is the idea that these gains arise from synergies 
of various kinds.  Because the law has long treated appraisal as allowing 
an exit for an investor not willing to enter the newly created combination, 
it was logical to limit the investor’s compensation to what his shares were 
worth without considering the merger’s financial benefits or detriments.  
Section 262(h) recognizes this, as most statutes do, in commanding the 
court to determine the fair value of the dissenter’s shares, “exclusive of 
any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of 
                                                                                                                       
128 Burton G. Malkiel, Are Markets Efficient? – Yes, Even if They Make Errors, WALL 
ST. J., Dec. 28, 2007, reprinted in William J. Carney, CORPORATE FINANCE: PRINCIPLES AND 
PRACTICE (3d ed), 149–51. 
129 Grace Bros. v. Farley Industries, Inc., 450 S.E.2d 814 (Ga. 1994).  
130 Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes 
and Consequences, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1155 (1985). 
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the merger or consolidation . . . .”131  Henry Manne’s seminal paper, 
Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, recognized that 
companies are valued as going concerns with their current management, 
and if that management was weak, and could be replaced by a stronger 
management team, that change of control would generate greater profits 
and add value to the firm.132  But the possibility of greater profit from 
future changes is not part of “value” that can be included in appraised 
value, according to the statute. 
 
Replacing poor management is not the only source of value in 
mergers and acquisitions.  Consolidations often reduce costs in industries 
with excess capacity.133  Technological change can make scale economies 
more important and efficient for larger companies.  Economies of scope 
in marketing often provide suppliers with better leverage to obtain 
improved shelf space.134  Creating a dominant producer also enhances 
market power to set prices.  Less frequently, tax benefits may play a role 
in an acquisition.  One of the most notable cases involving a tax-motivated 
transaction was Smith v. Van Gorkom.135  Trans Union held large tax loss 
carry-forwards that it could not expect to utilize in the foreseeable future, 
but would be attractive to a tax-paying entity.136  A variety of target 
characteristics can create value for bidders, such as economies of scale or 
latent debt capacity, which upon acquisition would result in a net increase 
in value for the business combination.137  Financial deals that take a 
company private can also benefit from reducing the regulatory costs of 
being a publicly traded company.  These costs can be significant even for 
large corporations.138 
Holding a security for a long time may be evidence that the holder 
is satisfied with the security’s performance and its role in the investor’s 
                                                                                                                       
 131 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h). 
132 Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 
110, 112–13 (1965). 
133 John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J. LAW & 
ECON. 137 (1958). 
134 See generally William J. Carney, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: CASES AND 
MATERIALS, 11–21 (4th ed. 2016).  
135 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
136 Bernard Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN L. REV. 597, 599–600 
(1989) (discussing the use of purchase accounting to write up the value of assets, thus increasing 
depreciation expense, a deductible item).  
137 Ralph A. Walkling & Robert O. Edmeister, Determinants of Tender Offer Premiums, 
FIN. ANALYSTS J. 27, 30 (Jan.–Feb. 1985). 
138 Cox Communications, with sales of $5.789 billion, went private for these reasons. 
See generally, William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public after Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of 
“Going Private,” 55 EMORY L. J. 141, 149 (2006). 
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portfolio, and does not see a more attractive substitute (though 
underperformance may well simply be reflected in the current price).  One 
could characterize the security’s price as “fair,” although this word is 
rarely employed.  This accounts for part of the popularity of index funds, 
with their low cost buy and hold strategies, in today’s market.  To persuade 
an investor to relinquish a holding requires the offer of a more attractive 
alternative.  In stock markets, that alternative is typically a price at a 
premium over today’s market price. 
 
There is much evidence to support the assertion that selling 
shareholders receive substantial premiums in acquisitions. 139  “It is 
well accepted that creating value gains (synergy) or incremental cash 
flows from mergers has been the dominating explanation provided to the 
shareholders of moving parties.”140  One author calculated the premium 
paid based on the market value of the target two months prior to the 
announcement date minus one.141  Premiums averaged 19% in the 1960s, 
35% in the 1970s, and 30% from 1980 to 1985.142  A study covering 
mergers from 1999 to 2002showed average premiums of 36% in cash 
mergers and 30% in stock for stock mergers.143  A study of deals from 
2000 to 2008 shows average premiums for strategic bidders of 16.7%, and 
11.7% for financial bidders.144  Returns to shareholders of bidders appear 
much smaller, and in some cases are negative.145  Gains to bidder 
shareholders appear to be smaller because of bidder competition for a 
target.146  While there are some observers who attribute lower gains for 
bidder shareholders (and sometimes losses) to agency costs—that poor 
                                                                                                                       
139 Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The Market for Corporate Control: The 
Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5, (1983); Black, supra note 140; Lawrence A. 
Hamermesh, Premiums in Stock-for-Stock Mergers and Some Consequences in the Law of 
Director Fiduciary Duties, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 881 (2003). One study reports that total premiums 
between 1981 and 1986 were $118.4 billion.  Gregg A. Jarrell, et al., The Market for Corporate 
Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2, No. 1 J. ECON. PERSP. 49 (1988) (hereinafter 
“Jarrell”).  
140 Ahmad Ismail, Does Management’s Forecast of Merger Synergies Explain the 
Premium Paid, the Method of Payment, and Merger Motives?, 40 FINANCIAL MGT. 879 (Winter 
2011).  
141 Id. at 884.  
142 Jarrell, et al., supra note 143, at 51.  
143 Hamermesh, supra note 143, at 913 (Appendix A) (2003).  
144 Alexander S. Gorbenko & Andrey Malenko, Strategic & Financial Bidders in 
Takeover Auctions, 69 J. FIN. 2513, 2514 (2014).  
145 Jarrell et al, supra note 143, at 53 (Table 1); Ralph A. Walkling and Robert O. 
Edmister, Determinants of Tender Offer Premiums, FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J., 31-32 (Jan.–Feb. 
1985).  
146 Id. 
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managers overspend in acquisitions—there  is evidence to the contrary.147  
One paper is more sympathetic, suggesting that with imperfect knowledge 
of the future, many bidders may err in estimating future synergies and cost 
reductions.  Thus, the winner of an auction may, by making the most 
optimistic estimate, suffer from the “winner’s curse.”148  A recent study, 
using call option prices to measure gains in takeovers finds roughly equal 
sharing between target and acquiring company shareholders.149  Ismail 
uses different methodology, comparing actual accounting results over time 
with estimated synergies, and finds lower returns to buyers.150  He finds 
that buyers underpaid for predicted synergies in about one-third of cases 
and overpaid in the other two-thirds.151  That, of course, does not change 
the measure of gains from the transaction to target shareholders.  However, 
these studies are viewed, there are clear gains for target shareholders, 
solely attributable to the acquisition.   
 
B. Control Premiums Only Exist at the Time of a Sale and are not 
Part of the “Intrinsic Value” of a Firm 
 
Some have argued that control premiums exist in every company, 
and that takeover bidders merely exploit this invisible asset in acquisitions, 
at the expense of small shareholders.152  The literature persuasively shows 
that control premia do not exist without news of buyer interest.153  It shows, 
in the case of financially motivated transactions involving “going private,” 
                                                                                                                       
147 Black, supra note 140 at 599 (1989) (disputing the market evidence in part based on 
contrary studies of accounting statements); Nikhil P. Varaiya &Kenneth R. Ferris, Overpaying 
in Corporate Takeovers: The Winner’s Curse, FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J., May–June, 1987, at 64.  
But see  Sarah B. Moeller, et al., Wealth Destruction on a Massive Scale? A Study of Acquiring- 
Firm Returns in the Recent Merger Wave, 40 J. Fin. 757 (2005) (finding that while most buyers 
gained value, some very large buyers suffered massive losses in acquisitions, which they 
attribute to information asymmetries). 
148 Varaiya & Ferris, supra note 151, at 65. 
149 Kathryn Barraclough, David T. Robinson, Tom Smith, & Robert E. Whaley, Using 
Option Prices to Infer Overpayments and Synergies in M&A Transactions, 26, No. 3 REV. OF 
FINANCIAL STUDIES 695, 719 (2013). 
150 Ismail, supra note 144, at 905.  
151 Id. at 889 (Table III).   
152 For a refutation of this position, see Carney and Heimendinger, supra note 1, at 879–
80.  
153 Id. at *29; Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Short and Puzzling 
Life of the 'Implicit Minority Discount' in Delaware Appraisal Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1 
(2007).[hereinafter Hamermesh & Wachter, Minority Discount] (taking a slightly different 
approach, observing that control can carry a premium, but that it does not belong to the firm).  
By negative implication, there is no minority discount that needs to be added in valuation of the 
firm.  They add one more benefit of control: the right to squeeze out the minority shareholders.  
Id. at 53.  
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that these premiums “are due to the blocking power typically accorded 
minority stockholders in going private transactions.”154  This is not to say 
that a controlling shareholder can never receive benefits that are not shared 
with minority shareholders, but rather that such benefits do not necessarily 
involve agency costs, wealth transfers through self-dealing, or other forms 
of wrongdoing.  Instead, they may involve divergent preferences about 
firm policies, such as timing and amount of firm distributions and 
investments, riskiness of new projects, and riskiness of firm capital 
structure, each with potential differential benefits for each group.155  We 
argue that no control premium exists absent an acquisition.  If a control 
block is transferred from one shareholder to another, any premium paid 
clearly belongs to the seller, absent any wrongdoing that harms the 
entity.156 
 
The fact that Gorbenko and Malenko’s study showed lower gains 
from financial acquisitions is not dispositive on the issue of control 
premiums.157  There is an abundant literature documenting the gains from 
financial deals.  To have premiums, there must necessarily be gains from 
trade.  Obviously, financial transactions do not involve synergies 
involving reduced transaction costs between suppliers and customers, nor 
gains from greater market dominance and pricing power, nor gains from 
economies of scope or scale.  Typically, in financial transactions there is 
no replacement of one management team with a superior one, at least at 
the onset.158  Gains instead come from the discipline imposed by higher 
                                                                                                                       
154 Jensen & Ruback, supra note 143, at 45.  
155 William J. Carney, The Theory of the Firm: Investor Coordination Costs, 
ControlPremiums and Capital Structure, 65 WASH. UNIV. L. Q. 1 (1987). Here we disagree with 
John C. Coates, "Fair Value" As An Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in 
Conflict Transactions, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1251, 1280 (1999).  Coates assigns control premiums 
to three basic categories: (1) synergy value – the value derived from a particular combination of 
economic assets; (2) expropriation value – the value from being able to use control unfairly to 
usurp value rightly belonging to the minority (which we believe is trivial if not nonexistent in 
virtually all public companies); and (3) pure control value – the residual value attaching to the 
authority to control corporate policy on an ethical and fiduciarily-compliant basis. Coates argues 
that all control premiums "should be analyzed initially as reflecting each of these types of value." 
Id. at 1274–77.  No suggestion is given about how to unpack these three elements of a premium. 
156 See, e.g., Abraham v. Emerson Radio Corp., 901 A.2d 751, 762 (Del. Ch. 2006). 
157 Gorbenko & Malenko, supra note 148, at 2541–42. 
158 We are unaware of studies that separate management treatment in financial 
transactions as opposed to strategic deals. Most of the studies were done in the early stages of 
hostile takeovers, with fewer done in the current era of negotiated transactions.  One study found 
that approximately 52% of all top managers will no longer be employed by a target three years 
after a successful takeover. Perham, Surge in Executive Job Contracts, 32 DUN'S BUS. MONTH 
86 (1981). In another study, Gregg Jarrell, in The Wealth Effects of Litigation by Targets: Do 
Interests Diverge in a Merge?, 28 J. LAW & ECON. 151, 172 (1985), found 50% attrition rates 
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leverage, greater management equity investments, the deductibility of 
interest payments, use of underutilized tax benefits (Trans Union), 
reduction of regulatory (securities compliance) costs, and more direct 
owner supervision of management, all of which can reduce agency costs 
and increase returns to equity.159  Michael Jensen has described financial 
acquisitions as creating a new form of ownership:  
 
organizations that are corporate in form but have no 
public shareholders and are not listed or traded on 
organized exchanges. . . . Their primary owners are not 
individuals nor passively managed institutions  but large 
actively managed private equity institutions and 
entrepreneurs that designate agents to manage and 
monitor on their behalf and bind those agents with large 
equity interests and contracts governing the use and 
distribution of cash.160 
 
Delaware’s treatment of the exclusion of effects of the merger 
announcement has not been consistent.   The Court of Chancery has 
correctly stated that  ”[i]n an arm's-length, synergistic transaction, the deal 
price generally will exceed fair value because target fiduciaries bargain for 
                                                                                                                       
in one-half of the firms that successfully defeated bids. This figure, Jarrell believes, is well above 
the normal turnover rate of 25%, suggesting that bids are traumatic events for managers 
regardless of their success. See also Turnover at the Top, BUS. WEEK, Dec. 19, 1983, at 104; 
Coff, Merger Mania Adds to Executive Woes, N. Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 1982), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1982/10/17/jobs/merger-mania-adds-to-executive-woes.html. 
Charles Knoeber, Golden Parachutes, Shark Repellents, and Hostile Tender Offers, 76 AM. 
ECON. REV. 155 (1986). Knoeber characterized target managers as accepting deferred 
compensation in many instances, which shareholders can opportunistically capture by accepting 
a tender offer for control. See also Lambert & Larker, Golden Parachutes, Executive Decision–
Making and Shareholder Wealth, 7 J. ACCTG. & ECON. 179 (1985). Displacement after a change 
of control appears to be one of the major risks facing managers. A BUSINESS WEEK survey of 
1300 terminated managers was reported to have shown that nearly one-third were terminated 
after a change of control. Walkling & Long, Strategic Issues in Cash Tender Offers: Predicting 
Bid Premiums, Probability of Success, and Target Management's response, 4, No. 2 MIDLAND 
CORP. FIN. J.  57, 64, n.10 (1986). 
159 Harry DeAngelo, Linda DeAngelo & Edward M. Rice, Going Private: Minority 
Freezeouts and Stockholder Wealth, 27 J. L. & ECON. 367, 370–74 (1984); Jensen & Ruback, 
supra note 144, at 23–24 (describing financial motivations);  Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. 
Davidoff, Form Over Substance? The Value of Corporate Process and Management Buy-Outs, 
36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 849, 865–69 (2011) (noting the benefits of MBOs and citing studies) 
William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of “Going Dark,” 
55 EMORY L. J. 1, 2–3 (2005) (noting the effect of Sarbanes-Oxley costs on smaller public 
companies); Gorbenko & Malenko, supra note 148, at 2536–37.   
160 Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. BUS. REV. 61 (1989). 
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a premium that includes . . . a share of the anticipated synergies."161  
Indeed, ‘the ability of target fiduciaries to obtain a premium to market 
implies that they successfully extracted a portion of the value that the 
acquirer planned to create and that the merger consideration therefore 
exceeds the fair value of the standalone entity as a going concern.’"162  In 
many cases the Delaware courts never discuss pre-deal announcement 
market prices at all, virtually precluding exclusion of “any element of 
value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or 
consolidation.”163  This is so even though the Delaware Supreme Court has 
recently noted that removal of the Delaware Block Method “does not mean 
that the pre-transaction trading price of a public company’s shares is not 
relevant to its fair value in appraisal,” while not mentioning that specific 
value in the case at hand.164  As Fischel has observed, why should a 
minority shareholder expect to receive more in a merger than he or she 
could obtain by selling in an efficient market?165 
 
C. Backing Out of Control Premiums and Synergies to Obtain Firm 
Values Involves Guesswork and Speculation 
 
The Delaware courts have rarely taken the exclusion of control 
premiums seriously. In Kleinwort Benson v. Silgan Corp., Chancellor 
Chandler correctly declined to apply a control premium “because it 
reflects value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the 
merger.”166  As he later explained, the court “will not specifically consider 
. . . control premiums paid in merger transactions because those reflect 
expected future profits after the merger (i.e., synergy values).”167  In 
another case while the Court of Chancery conceded that “there remains 
some uncertainty about the actual amount of impermissible post-merger 
[synergies] reflected in [data on] control premiums”, it applied a 30% 
control premium to eliminate an erroneously presumed minority 
                                                                                                                       
161 Olson v. EV3, Inc., No.5583-VCL  2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 342011); see also Dell, 177 
A.3d at 76–77.  
162 Dunmire v. Farmers & Merch. Of W. Pa., Inc., No. 10589-CB, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
167, at *24 (Del. Ch. Nov. 10, 2016). 
163 See, e.g., Merion Capital, L.P. v. 3M Cogent, Inc., No. 6247-VCP, 2013 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 172, at *2 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2013); infra Appendix A.  
164 DFC Global, 172 A.3d at 373. 
165 Daniel R. Fischel, Efficient Capital Markets, the Crash, and the Fraud on the Market 
Theory, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 917, 920 (1989).  
166 Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v. Silgan Corp., No. 11107, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, at *4 
(Del. Ch. June 15, 1995). 
167 ONTI, Inc. v. Integra Bank, 751 A.2d 904, 913 (Del. Ch. 1999).  
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discount.168  The court should have recognized that any premium paid is 
based on an expectation of benefits to the buyer from the transaction.  In a 
financially motivated “going private” transaction, the court found no 
control premium, and that the only deal synergies were tax savings and 
cost savings from going private, and accepted the deal price as the best 
evidence of fair value (including whatever synergies from tax and agency 
cost savings, and regulatory savings might have existed because of the 
deal).169 
 
The Delaware courts have long mistakenly concluded that where a 
dominant shareholder exists, publicly traded shares must necessarily trade 
at a discount.170  More recently, in Dell, the Court of Chancery erroneously 
rejected market values as infected with investor myopia and an anchoring 
bias, ignoring the dominance of sophisticated financial institutions and 
analysts in today’s markets.171  On appeal this was reversed for an absence 
of supporting evidence in an efficient market.  Given current judicial 
assumptions that control premiums are inherent in all companies, with or 
without a dominant stockholder, the courts are faced with the impossible 
task of separating included control premiums from excluded synergy 
values in appraising value.  One is tempted to ask, “will the Delaware 
courts ever trust markets as investors do?”  
 
The Court of Chancery has recognized the synergies included in any 
deal premium.172  In Longpath Capital LLC v. Ramtron Int’l Corp. the 
Court of Chancery attributed half of the deal premium to a “control 
premium” (a discredited concept, as we discussed above) and the other 
half to deal synergies.173  The court accepted the methodology of the 
respondent’s expert, who attempted to determine the value of deal 
synergies by examining premiums paid in strategic deals versus those 
                                                                                                                       
168 Borruso v. Commc’ns Telesystems Int’l, 753 A.2d 451, 459, n. 12 (Del. Ch. 1999).   
169 Merion Capital, L.P. v. 3M Cogent, Inc.,  No. 6247-VCP, 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 172, 
at *2, *8–9, *12 ( Del. Ch. July 8, 2013) 
170 See, e.g., Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989); Rapid-American 
Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796 (Del. 1992).    
171 Dell, 177 A.3d , at *102. 
172 Kenneth R. Ahern, Bargaining Power and Industry Dependence in Mergers, 103 J. 
FIN. ECONS. 530, 547 (2012) (showing that targets capture on average "modestly more" of the 
merger gains than buyers); Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Short and 
Puzzling Life of the 'Implicit Minority Discount' in Delaware Appraisal Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
1, 29 (2007) ("In an arm's-length transaction, an acquirer will pay a premium to [the equity 
value] in purchasing the firm.”). 
173 LongPath Capital, Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Ramtron Int'l Corp., No. 8094-VCP, 2015 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 177, at *88–89 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015). 
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(smaller) premiums paid in financial deals.  The percentage difference, he 
concluded, represented the synergies in strategic deals, with the balance of 
synergy gains retained by the buyer.  This may be a reasonable measure of 
synergies, but Section 262(h) does not address synergies alone, but “any 
element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the 
merger.”  The Longpath court relied on a study by Gregg Jarrell, a frequent 
witness in appraisal cases, that purported to find a “control premium” by 
comparing deal premiums in acquisitions by strategic buyers with 
acquisitions by financial buyers.174  This only demonstrates that 
synergistic gains from trade vary across types of transactions, and 
assuredly between transactions of the same type.  More importantly, 
averages conceal wide variances in outcomes in individual cases.     
 
Perhaps the most egregious example of ignoring the exclusion rule 
is Merion Capital L.P. v. Lender Processing Servs., where Vice 
Chancellor Laster recited much credible evidence about the size of the 
synergies included in the deal price (about 20%) by the petitioner, only to 
ultimately ignore this evidence, employing the deal price ($37.14), on the 
basis that the company’s expert provided no opinion on this and the 
company was late making this argument.175  The court observed that 
evidence in the record indicated that the merger consideration “included a 
portion of the value that Fidelity and THL expected to generate from 
synergies.”176  It further noted that petitioner modeled $100 million in 
synergies, or $7.50 per share.177  While relying on partisan experts, the 
court ignored the more impartial evidence of pre-announcement value 
from independent analysts, who had a median price target of $25.00 with 
a high price target of $31.00.178  At the same time it cited another opinion 
that “the price actually derived from the sale of a company as a whole . . . 
may be considered as long as synergies are excluded.”179  The court also 
ignored Vice Chancellor Glascock’s statement in In re Appraisal of 
Ancestry.com, Inc., that the unique construction of Section 262 places 
burdens on both parties, thus leaving judges on their own in determining 
                                                                                                                       
174 Id. at *79–82, *85. 
175 Merion Capital L.P. v. Lender Processing Servs., No. 9320-VCL, 2016 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 189, at *35, *38–39 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2016). 
176  Id. at *32.  
177 Id. at *34.  
 178 Id. at *17. 
179 Id. at *41, n. 5 (citing Prescott Gp. Small Cap. L.P. v. Coleman Co., No. 17802-VCL, 
2004 WL 2059515 at *27 (Del. Ch. Sept. 8, 2004) (emphasis added).. 
 
  
 DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW VOL. 43 
 
 
102 
fair value.180  The irony of that statement is that it was made in the face of 
reliable market prices determined by expert traders and analysts with far 
more expertise than a law-trained judge, and their own or clients’ money 
at stake.181  
 
In re Appraisal of SWS Group, Inc. is a rare case where synergies in 
the form of scale economies to achieve cost savings were discussed 
extensively.  The respondent’s expert specifically excluded them in his 
calculation of fair value, resulting in a valuation well below the deal 
price.182  
 
The most recent ironic example is found in the Supreme Court’s 
DFC Global opinion, where Chief Justice Strine conceded the accuracy 
and rationality of the pre-announcement market price, but apparently not 
its materiality, stating that because the shares at issue “were widely traded 
on a public market based upon a rich information base, the ‘fair value of 
the stockholder’s shares of stock held by minority stockholders like the 
petitioners, would, to an economist, likely be best reflected by the prices 
at which their shares were trading as of the merger.”183  Rather than 
                                                                                                                       
180 In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., No. 8173-VCG, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 21: “It 
is worth noting, however, that this task is made particularly difficult for the bench judge, not 
simply because his training may not provide a background well-suited to the process, but also 
because of the way the statute is constructed. A judge in Chancery is the finder of fact, and is 
frequently charged to make difficult factual determinations that may be outside his area of 
expertise. The saving judicial crutch in such situations is the burden of proof. The party with the 
burden must explain why its version of the facts is the more plausible in a way comprehensible 
and convincing to the trier of fact; if not, it has failed to carry its burden, and the judge's duty is 
accordingly clear. A judge in a bench trial relies, therefore, on the burden of proof; he holds on 
to it like a shipwreck victim grasps a floating deck-chair or an ex-smoker hoards his last piece 
of nicotine gum. Section 262 is unusual in that it purports explicitly to allocate the burden of 
proof to the petitioner and the respondent, an allocation not meaningful in light of the fact that 
no default exists if the burden is not met; in reality, the ‘burden’ falls on the judge to determine 
fair value, using ‘all relevant factors.’  Here, therefore, I must independently review those factors 
to determine ‘fair value,’ the price per share to which the Petitioners are entitled.”  See also In 
re Appraisal of SWS Group, Inc., 2017 WL 2334852 (Del. Ch. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Merlin v. 
Sws Group, 2018 Del. LEXIS 77.  
181 Vice Chancellor Laster reviewed the difficulties the Court of Chancery has faced in 
this area in his Aruba opinion, No. 11448–VCL, 2018 WL 922139, at *44–45.  See also In re 
Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., No. 8173-VCG, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 21 at *2, where Vice 
Chancellor Glascock noted “ I have commented elsewhere on the difficulties, if not outright 
incongruities, of a law-trained judge determining fair value of a company in light of an auction 
sale, aided by experts offering wildly different opinions on value.” Later he referred to the 
difficulties of employing a DCF analysis with a mind “softened as it has been by a liberal arts 
education.” Id. at *59. 
182 In re Appraisal of SWS Group, Inc., 2017 WL 2334852  at *8.  
183 DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, 172 A.2d 346, 367 (Del. 2017). 
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concede that valuation is a question determined by markets, he rejected 
that, arguing that the court had earlier “adopted a definition of fair value 
that is a jurisprudential, rather than purely economic, construct.”  Here the 
court cites a minority discount case for the assertion that “going concern” 
value includes the pro rata value of the entire enterprise.184  There is no 
mention of the exclusion of the anticipated or realized effects of the 
merger. 
 
Following Chief Justice Strine’s lead, Justice Valihura’s Dell 
opinion preserves the notion that Delaware law makes valuation a 
jurisprudential concept and omits any discussion of market value or the 
limitations of Section 262(h).185 
 
Vice Chancellor Laster’s opinion in Aruba reflects unusual candor 
by the parties and their experts: “The parties agree that it is not possible to 
determine with precision what portion of the final deal price reflects 
synergy value.  The respondent’s expert conceded that ‘[t]he percentage 
of synergies actually paid by HP to Aruba cannot be accurately 
measured.’”186 
 
Vice Chancellor Laster’s response to concerns about value boil 
down to whether the investors were given at least as much as or more than 
the market price determined in an efficient market without manipulation: 
 
Perhaps different negotiators could have extracted a 
greater share of the synergies from HP in the form of a 
higher deal price.  *     *    *  An outcome along these lines 
would have resulted in HP sharing a greater portion of the 
anticipated synergies with Aruba’s stockholders.  It would 
not have changed Aruba’s standalone value.  Hence, it 
would not have affected Aruba’s fair value for purposes 
of an appraisal.187 
 
 
                                                                                                                       
184 Id. (citing Cavalier Oil, 564 A.2d , at 1144–45.  As we have pointed out, the notion 
of a “control premium” employed in Cavalier Oil, is a discredited one.  And yet it persists here 
in an amorphous fashion. 
185 There is a rote recital of the statutory limit on value without any discussion of its 
application in the case at hand. See  Dell, 177 A.3d, at *38. 
186 Aruba, No. 11448–VCL, 2018 WL 922139, at *44. 
187 Id. 
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V. EXPLORING SOLUTIONS 
 
The uncertainty created by the proliferation of appraisal litigation, 
driven by appraisal arbitrageurs that take little risk at the present, creates 
real costs for deals, and ultimately for the economy.  Buyers are 
increasingly insisting on “outs” from deals, thus limiting the advantages 
made available in acquisitions.188  The more competitive the market for 
the target, the greater its bargaining power, and the higher the acquisition 
price will rise, leaving fewer benefits from the bargain for the buyer, and 
the more buyers will insist on outs if holders of many shares seek 
appraisal.  Other buyers may back out of deals if they can’t obtain such an 
out, and those costs will remain invisible. 
 
There are two goals in reform.  First, in the interest of economic 
efficiency, where a selling process is a model of thoroughness and 
independence, why should a court ever second-guess the deal price as the 
ceiling on fair value?  Why should we expect non-expert judges, 
potentially influenced by polarized and biased experts, to know more 
about the value of a stock than the company’s own directors and 
shareholders, all of whom have skin in the game, in terms of stock and 
stock options?   Second, why should a privileged few (large) shareholders 
receive more compensation than the majority of informed disinterested 
shareholders who approved the transaction? 
 
With this in mind, we offer the following consequences from simply 
following the statute, respecting market valuations rather than those of 
biased experts, and excluding prices influenced by expectations or 
realizations of the effects of a merger.189 
 
                                                                                                                       
188 Appraisal Risk in Private Equity Transactions, PRIV. EQUITY DIG. (Paul, Weiss, 
Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP), May 2017, at 4, 
https://www.paulweiss.com/media/3977122/may-2017-pe-digest-r15.pdf. (showing an increase 
in the percentage of agreements with appraisal outs in public deals from 4.1% in 2014 to 18.1% 
in the first two months of 2017);  Audra Boone et al., Merger Negotiations in the shadow of 
Judicial Appraisal, Indiana Legal Studies Research Paper No. 381 (June 11, 2018), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3039040, (arguing that there is no 
evidence that appraisal risks lower bidders’ offers to compensate for the risk).  In part that may 
be true because appraisal outs remove that risk for bidders, but raise the risk of failure for targets. 
189 Ironically, we quote Justice Walsh’s opinion in Barkan v. Amsted Industries, Inc., 
567 A.2d 1279, 1287 (Del. 1989) (quoting the Chancellor) (“A decent respect for reality forces 
one to admit that . . .  advice [of an investment banker] is frequently a pale substitute for the 
dependable information that a canvas of the relevant market can provide.”). 
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For public companies, there are four categories: 
1. Cash mergers where there is no controlling shareholder. 
2. Cash mergers involving a controlling shareholder. 
3. Stock mergers where there is no controlling shareholder.190 
4. Stock mergers where there is a controlling shareholder. 
Here are the issues in each category: 
1. Cash mergers where there is no controlling shareholder. 
Here we have simple disinterested majority approval by both 
shareholders and directors, assuming a proper search and full disclosure.  
Most of the recent appraisal cases fit this description.  If the goal of 
appraisal is exit from an unwanted merger, a cash deal satisfies that need.   
If the goal of appraisal is fair value, any deal price at or above the pre-
announcement price more than satisfies that need. 
2. Cash mergers involving a controlling shareholder.  
As in #1, exit is satisfied here.  If the goal of appraisal is fair value, 
any price above the pre-announcement price more than satisfies that need, 
because shareholders bought into a company with a controlling 
shareholder, and thus accepted the possibility of a cash-out.191  
3. Stock mergers where there is no controlling shareholder. 
Here, if there is a board search that satisfies business judgment rule 
standards, and approval by a majority of fully independent shareholders, 
a decent respect for board and shareholder collective judgment requires 
deferral to that price, and employment of the pre-announcement value of 
the stock as fair value.192  In this case, as in the final one, some attention 
might be paid to the statute, where Section 144 provides a safe harbor from 
challenges to director actions. 
4. Stock mergers with a controlling shareholder. 
                                                                                                                       
190 We include stock mergers for purposes of a complete model, recognizing that there 
are exceptions from the appraisal right in stock mergers where shareholder are to receive shares 
in a publicly traded corporation, under  DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(2)b. 
191 Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Short and Puzzling Life of the 
'Implicit Minority Discount' in Delaware Appraisal Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 53 (2007). 
192 Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015). 
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Where a merger with a controlling shareholder is approved by an 
independent board or committee with full power to consider alternatives 
and to recommend them, and the transaction is conditioned on approval by 
fully informed independent shareholders, there is no reason for a court to 
be concerned about the fairness of the price, beyond the conceit that judges 
know best.193 
 
For all these categories, courts could implement the reforms we 
suggest under existing statutory law.  That said, legislative codification of 
this approach is certainly welcome, because codification would make it 
more difficult for courts to resist this approach and substitute their own 
discretionary valuations for the pre-deal market prices. 
 
Our discussion until now has concerned publicly traded firms, for 
which using the pre-deal market price to calculate the appraisal remedy 
appropriately satisfies the requirement of Section 262(h) to exclude the 
value of deal synergies.  But this approach is not available for transactions 
involving closely held target firms, because for them there is no pre-deal 
market price.  This does not mean, however, that value in such cases must 
necessarily be established via judicial discretion.  Discretionary valuation 
is also problematic for closely held firms,194 and alternatives to judicial 
discretion are available for them too. 
 
One way that closely held transacting parties may protect 
themselves from discretionary judicial valuation is by including a 
discretion limiting, algorithmic valuation clause in their charters, bylaws, 
joint venture agreements, or buyout provisions.195  With such a 
                                                                                                                       
193 Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014). 
194 See e.g.,  Del. Open MRI Radiology Assocs., P.A. v. Kessler, 898 A.2d 290 (Del. Ch. 
2006) (Strine, V.C.) (exercising judicial discretion to asymmetrically split the difference 
between the party experts to value a medical practice entity at a figure maintained by neither of 
the parties to the appraisal litigation).  For other examples of unpredictable judicial difference 
splitting in Delaware appraisal cases involving both public and private firms, see Keith 
Sharfman, Contractual Valuation Mechanisms and Corporate Law, 2 VA. L.  & BUS. REV. 53, 
61 n. 32–33  (2007) (collecting cases).  These unpredictable, divergent results cause appraisal 
litigants to invest excessively in their evidentiary presentations and raise the cost of settlement.  
Id. at 59; see also Keith Sharfman, Valuation Averaging: A New Procedure for Resolving 
Valuation Disputes, 88 MINN. L. REV. 357, 360, 377 (2003). 
195 Litigation management bylaws have in recent years become quite common for 
Delaware firms, especially now that the Delaware courts enforce them (see In re Revlon, Inc. 
Shareholders Litigation, 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch., 2010)) and the Delaware legislature in 
2015 specifically authorized them in Section 115, at least as to so-called “intra-corporate 
disputes,” which appraisal actions surely are.  But we must note that at least as to forum selection 
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"contractual valuation mechanism" in place, value is calculated 
algorithmically on the basis of a pre-specified formula involving party-
supplied and/or neutral expert appraisals, effectively eliminating judicial 
discretion to find value in some other way.196  A typical contractual 
valuation structure is for the parties to offer competing appraisals with the 
average of them becoming the conclusive value if it is no more than 10% 
higher than the lower of the two appraisals.  Otherwise, a third appraiser 
is chosen by a pre-specified neutral party (such as the target firm’s external 
auditor), and the resulting neutral figure (or an average of that figure with 
one or both or the party appraisals, if they are close enough—say, within 
30%—to the neutral figure)  becomes the conclusive value.197  This 
structure provides predictable outcomes and gives valuation disputants the 
incentive to offer conciliatory figures, thereby reducing the cost of 
litigation and increasing the chance of settlement.  And most importantly, 
to protect the parties from discretionary valuation by the trier of fact. 
 
There are many examples of firms using such clauses in intra-
corporate agreements.198 And the Court of Chancery has accepted such 
pre-specified formulas and enforced them in appraisal litigation.199  If the 
Supreme Court were to follow suit, closely held transacting parties would 
likely welcome the development.  
 
Algorithmic valuation also holds promise as an alternative to 
discretionary judicial valuation (for appraisal cases, as well as for 
valuation disputes in other legal contexts) even when the litigants have not 
specified such a valuation mechanism in advance of any dispute.  As one 
                                                                                                                       
and potentially in other respects, they are now under challenge in federal court.  See generally 
John C. Jorgenson, Drafting Effective Delaware Forum-Selection Clauses in the Shadow of 
Enforcement Uncertainty, 102 IOWA L.  REV. 353 (2017) (discussing the enforceability of 
forum-selection bylaws); Joseph A. Grundfest, The History and Evolution of Intra-Corporate 
Forum Selection Clauses: An Empirical Analysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 333 (2012). 
196 See  Keith Sharfman, Contractual Valuation Mechanisms and Corporate Law, 2 VA. 
L.  &  BUS. REV. 53 (2007) (introducing the concept of contractual valuations mechanisms, 
documenting their frequent use by both public and private firms and their successful 
enforcement in Delaware, and proposing that they be used in conjunction with choice of law and 
forum selection clauses in corporate charters as a way for transacting parties to insulate 
themselves from discretionary judicial valuation). 
197 Id. at 66. 
198 See Id. at 66–69, 78–88 (discussing and tabulating multiple examples). 
199 Nextel Commc'ns, Inc. v. Nextel Partners, Inc., Civ. Act. No. 1704-N (Del. Ch. Nov. 
18, 2005) (Transcript of Oral Ruling) (enforcing a valuation mechanism in appraisal litigation 
concerning a buyout in the Sprint/Nextel joint venture). 
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of us has argued elsewhere,200 algorithmic valuation may be legislatively 
imposed, making available to valuation litigants the valuation mechanisms 
that sophisticated transacting parties who anticipate valuation disputes 
agree to use in lieu of open-ended discretionary valuation by the trier of 
fact.  Such market mimicking legislation is especially needed for corporate 
appraisal of closely held firms for which there is not a pre-deal market 
price on which the trier of fact may rely.201  
 
A final issue to consider concerning algorithmic valuation is the 
case of multiple parties.  Suppose, for instance, that there are multiple 
shareholders of a closely held firm dissenting from a transaction and 
seeking a judicial appraisal of their shares as a remedy.  And suppose 
further that these dissenting shareholders divide into two or more groups, 
contending for two or more proposed valuations.  Is there an algorithmic 
mechanism for resolving the dispute in such a circumstance? 
 
The answer to that question is "yes."  All that need be done in such 
a case is to calculate an appropriately weighted average proposed 
valuation for the dissenting shareholders.202  For instance, if 60% of the 
dissenters contend that the appraisal value of their shares is $X and 40% 
of the dissenters maintain that the appraisal value is $Y, the weighted 
average of the dissenting shareholders’ position would be [(0.6 )(X) + 
(0.4)(Y)].  It would then be a simple matter to apply the mandated two-
party algorithm to the resulting weighted average and the opposing side’s 
competing figure.  In this way, a weighted averaging of multiple valuations 
on the same side could itself become part of the valuation algorithm and 
thereby obviate the need for (or justification of) discretionary judicial 
valuation in appraisal cases that continues to persist in Delaware.    
 
                                                                                                                       
200 Keith Sharfman, Valuation Averaging: A New Procedure for Resolving Valuation 
Disputes, 88 MINN. L. REV. 357, 358 (2003) (“propos[ing] a new default valuation procedure, 
modeled on the algorithmic valuation clauses commonly used in the contracts of sophisticated 
firms, that would encourage parties to valuation disputes to introduce more plausible valuations 
into evidence and limit adjudicative discretion over how to resolve any remaining differences.”); 
On algorithmic implementation of law more generally, see Anthony Casey & Anthony Niblett, 
The Death of Rules and Standards, 92 IND. L.  J. 1401 (2017) (suggesting that legal rules and 
standards may be satisfied via algorithmic microdirectives that do not require factfinding by an 
adjudicator).  
201 Keith Sharfman, Contractual Valuation Mechanisms and Corporate Law, 2 VA. L.  & 
BUS. REV. at 59 (explaining that “the legal valuation problem is perhaps most acute in the 
corporate appraisal context, where the stakes are often high and the problem frequently recurs”). 
202 On utilizing weighted averages in situations of multi-party/multi-positional valuation 
litigation, see Keith Sharfman, Judicial Valuation Behavior: Some Evidence from Bankruptcy, 
32 FLA. ST. U.  L. REV 387, 398–399 (2005); see also Sharfman, 88 MINN. L. REV. at 376, 383. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Each block of Marble, Michelangelo believed (or 
purported to believe) contained a sculpture; the sculptor’s 
job was merely to pitch the overburden to reveal the 
beauty within.  Early jurists believed (or purported to 
believe) something similar about common law; that it 
existed in perfect form, awaiting “finding” by the judge.  
By contrast, even Blackstone would expect that statutory 
law would be an explicit, if blunt, tool of justice; 
manufactured, rather than revealed.  Our appraisal statute, 
Section 262 of the DGCL, is an exception.  Broth of many 
cooks and opaque of intent, it provides every opportunity 
for judicial sculpting.203 
 
Returning to some deference for statutory guidance would eliminate 
much uncertainty and decrease legal costs.  This statute is clear enough, 
and principles of finance and materiality are equally so.  
 
We have mainly argued here for reliance on the pre-deal market 
price for share valuation in appraisal litigation involving public 
companies.  To achieve this result, the courts would simply need to give 
actual respect to market prices rather than merely pay them lip service as 
the Supreme Court has consistently done, most recently in Dell and DFC.  
And abandoning the so-called "jurisprudence" of discretionary valuation 
would have the added virtue of obeying and giving effect to the statutory 
command in Section 262(h) to exclude the value of synergies from the 
appraisal calculus. 
 
For appraisal of shares in closely held firms, we have suggested that 
parties protect themselves transactionally from discretionary valuation 
with contractual valuation mechanisms in their charters, bylaws, joint 
venture agreements, and other buyout provisions.  We have also suggested 
that legislation imposing an algorithmic valuation process for appraisal 
cases involving closely held firms that is akin to what sophisticated firms 
often themselves agree to is possible to do and would be a salutary reform 
that would substantially improve upon the regime of discretionary 
valuation that now prevails in appraisal cases. 
 
                                                                                                                       
203 In re Appraisal of AOL, Inc., No. 11204-VCG, 2018 Del. Ch. 2018 WL 1037450, *1 
(Glascock, V.C.). 
  
 DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW VOL. 43 
 
 
110 
APPENDIX A 
 
Case Name Deal Price 
Per Share 
Appraised 
at 
S/h 
Expert 
Co. 
Expert 
Pre-Deal 
Market 
Price 
Ng v. Heng Sang 
Realty Corp., 2004 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 69 
    not traded 
 Highfields Capital, 
Ltd. v. AXA Fin., 
Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 
42 (Del. Ch. 2007) 
$31 $24.97 $43.03 $20.80 $28.20 
In re Appraisal of 
Dell Inc., 2016 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 81 
$13.65 $17.62 $28.61 $12.68 $12.00 
Rapid-American 
Corp. v. Harris, 603 
A.2d 796, 806 (Del. 
1992) 
$28.00 $51.00, 
then 
$73.29 on 
remand 
  $17.25 
Cavalier Oil Corp. 
v. Hartnett, 564 
A.2d 1137, 1144-45 
(Del. 1989) 
$75.16 $277.60    
Cede & Co. v. 
Technicolor, Inc., 
888 A.2d 26, 30 
(Del. 2005) 
$23.00 $23.22 $62.75 $13.14 $11.25 
Olson v. EV3, Inc., 
2011 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 34, 2011 
WL 704409 
Fee award 
case - not 
appraisal 
    
Dunmire v. Farmers 
& Merchs. Bancorp 
of W. Pa., 2016 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 167 
stock for 
stock (hard 
to value) 
$83.50 
$91.50 $137.97 $76.45  
LongPath Capital, 
LLC v. Ramtron 
Int'l Corp., 2015 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 177 
$3.10 $3.07 $4.96 $2.76 $1.81 
In re ISN Software 
Corp. Appraisal 
Litig., 2016 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 125, aff’d 
2017 Del.  LEXIS 
451 
$25,000 $89,783 $222,614 
& 
$230,000 
$29,360 not traded 
 Huff  Inv. 
Partnership v. Ckx, 
Inc., 2013 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 262, 2013 
WL 586120 
$5.50 $5.50 $11.02 $4.41 not 
mentioned 
 
*** 
  
